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My dissertation addresses topics in international nance. The rst chapter develops
a theoretical framework to analyze the composition of foreign investment during
liquidity crises. The second chapter examines the role of adverse selection and
liquidity in the breakdown of trade during crisis. The third chapter studies the
equity home bias puzzle in a decision-theoretic framework.
In the rst chapter, I develop a two-country model that analyzes the compo-
sition of capital ows (direct vs. portfolio) across two countries in the presence
of heterogeneity in liquidity risk and asymmetric information about investment
productivity. Direct investment is characterized by higher protability and private
information about investment productivity, while portfolio investment provides
greater risk diversication. I demonstrate the possibility of multiple equilibria due
to strategic complementarities in choosing direct investment. I analyze the e¤ect of
an increase in the liquidity risk on the composition of foreign investment. If there
is a unique equilibrium, then higher liquidity risk leads to a higher level of foreign
direct investment (FDI). If, however, there are multiple equilibria, higher liquidity
risk may lead to the opposite e¤ect, a decline of FDI. In this case, an outow of
FDI is induced by self-fullling expectations. The dual e¤ect of increased liquid-
ity risk on capital ows can be related to empirically observed patterns of foreign
investment during liquidity crises. Furthermore, my model o¤ers a liquidity-based
explanation for the phenomenon of bilateral FDI ows among developed countries,
and one-way FDI ows from developed to developing countries.
In the second chapter, I present a model that illustrates how adverse selection
in nancial markets can lead to increased asset price volatility and possibly to a
breakdown of trade. The asymmetric information about asset returns generates
the Akerlofs lemons problem, where buyers do not know whether the asset is sold
because of its low quality or because the seller has experienced a sudden need for
liquidity. The adverse selection can lead to equilibrium with no trade, reecting the
buyersbelief that most assets that are o¤ered for sale are of low quality. I analyze
the role of market liquidity and beliefs about likelihood of a crisis in amplifying
the e¤ect of adverse selection.
In the third chapter, I apply the smooth model of decision making under ambi-
guity to study the equity home bias puzzle. I show that di¤erence in beliefs about
perceived uncertainty, characterized by optimism or overcondence, can signi-
cantly contribute to the explanation of the equity home bias observed in the data.
I examine how ambiguity about the distribution of asset returns a¤ects equilibrium
prices and equity holdings in a two-country CARA-normal setting. All investors
possess the same information about the set of possible states and the correspond-
ing returns distribution in each state, but they have di¤erent beliefs about the
likelihood of these states. In this setting, optimism and overcondence refer to
distorted beliefs about the expected mean and the dispersion of the asset returns
distribution, respectively. I analyze and quantify the e¤ects of optimism and over-
condence on asset prices and asset holdings when investors are ambiguity averse.
Furthermore, I show that the equity home bias is larger in countries with smaller
market capitalization.
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CHAPTER 1
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS AND LIQUIDITY CRISES
1.1 Introduction
The two major types of international equity holdings are foreign direct investments
(FDI) and foreign portfolio investments (FPI). Liquidity crises may be associated
with an outow of FPI and a simultaneous inow of FDI, e.g., the 1994 crisis in
Mexico and the late 1990s crisis in South Korea.1 This behavior reects the re-
sale FDI phenomenon when domestic companies and assets are acquired by foreign
investors at re-sale prices. However, there is evidence that some liquidity crises
have been accompanied by an outow foreign investment, including FDI, e.g., the
2001 crisis in Argentina. Some theoretical literature argues that a liquidity crunch
may induce and aggravate a real crisis, leading to an exit of foreign investors.2 The
following question emerges: why during some liquidity crises is there an inow of
FDI while some others are accompanied by an outow of FDI?
In this paper, I develop a model which suggests an explanation of why FDI
ows exhibit such divergent behavior during liquidity crises. This paper presents a
two-country general equilibrium model which analyzes the composition of invest-
ment (direct vs portfolio) across two countries in the presence of heterogeneity in
liquidity risk and asymmetric information about the investment productivity.
The characteristic feature of direct investment is concentrated ownership and
control which provides access to private information about investment productiv-
1Krugman [59], Aguiar and Gopinath [4], Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer [1]
2Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee [3], Chang and Velasco [18], and Caballero and Krishna-
murthy [17].
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ity3 and results in a more e¢ cient management.4 Portfolio investment represents
holdings of assets which do not entail active management or control but allow
for risk diversication and greater liquidity. Taking advantage of the inside infor-
mation, direct investors may sell low-productive investments and keep the high-
productive ones under their ownership. This generates a "lemons"5 problem: the
buyers do not know whether the investment is sold because of its low productiv-
ity or due to an exogenous liquidity shock. Therefore, due to this information
asymmetry, there is a discount on the prematurely sold direct investment (rela-
tive to the prematurely sold portfolio investment). This assumption is consistent
with the evidence that there is a negative premium associated with seller-initiated
block trades.6 The main implication of this information-based trade-o¤ is that
the choice between direct and portfolio investment is linked to the likelihood with
which investors expect to get a liquidity shock (Goldstein and Razin [39]).
In my model, the agents have the Diamond-Dybvig [27] type preferences.
Agents consume in period 1 or 2, depending on whether they receive a liquid-
ity shock in period 1. The probability of an investor receiving a liquidity shock is
country-specic. This probability captures the investors exposure to the liquid-
ity shock; I will refer to it as the liquidity risk. In period zero, investors choose
how much to invest into risky long-term projects in each of the two countries, as
well as the ownership type for each project (direct or portfolio). In period one,
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are realized and, subsequently, risky investments are
traded in the nancial market. The late consumers are the buyers in the nancial
3Klein, Peek, and Rosengren [56], Kinoshita and Mody [55], Bolton and von Thadden [14],
Kahn and Winton [49]
4Due to the agency problem between managers and owners, portfolio investments are less
e¢ cient (Goldstein and Razin [39]).
5Akerlof (1970)
6Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers [46], Easley, Kiefer and OHara [28], Easley and OHara
[29], Keim and Madhavan [52]
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market. All investment projects pay o¤ in the second period.
This "cash-in-the-market" framework7 allows one to capture the e¤ect of mar-
ket liquidity (demand for risky investments in the interim period) on the investment
choice. The equilibrium prices of direct and portfolio investments depend not only
on their expected payo¤s but also on investors liquidity preferences and uncer-
tainty about the investment productivity. If market is more liquid then expected
gains from trading on private information are larger, since it is easier for informed
traders to hide behind the liquidity traders.8 Therefore, in a more liquid market
direct investors have higher prots from selling on private information. On the
other hand, a larger fraction of direct investors leads to a less liquid market.9
I demonstrate that there are two types of equilibria. In the rst type, only
investors from the country with a lower liquidity risk choose to hold direct invest-
ment. In the second type, investors from both countries hold direct investments. In
this case, there are strategic complementarities in choosing direct investment. This
generates a possibility of multiple equilibria through the self-fullling expectations.
If countries have the same fundamentals, the country with a higher liquidity risk
attracts less inward foreign investment, but a larger share of it is in the form of
FDI. Also, the country with a higher level of asymmetric information about invest-
ment productivity attracts more FDI relative to FPI since the marginal benets
from private information are larger.
I consider the e¤ect of an increase in the liquidity risk on the composition of
foreign investment. Such an increase results in the drying up of market liquidity
as more investors have to sell their risky asset holdings. At the same time, it
7Similarly to Allen and Gale [7] and Bhattacharya and Nicodano [12]
8Easley and OHara [29], Kyle [60]
9Bolton and von Thadden [14], Maug [66]
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becomes more likely that if a direct investment is sold before maturity, it is sold
due to exogenous liquidity needs rather than an adverse signal about investment
productivity. This reduces the adverse selection problem and therefore results in
a smaller information discount on prematurely sold direct investments. This e¤ect
captures the phenomenon of re-sale FDI during liquidity crises. If economy is in
the unique equilibrium then higher liquidity risk leads to a higher level of FDI.
However, if there are multiple equilibria then FDI may decline as the liquidity
risk becomes higher. In this case, an outow of FDI is induced by self-fullling
expectations.
There are two possible interpretations of the liquidity risk in my model. One is
the probability of a liquidity crisis that is unrelated to fundamentals of the econ-
omy. In fact, recent nancial crises exhibit a large liquidity run component while
the underlying macro fundamentals are not necessarily weak.10 Another interpre-
tation is a measure of nancial market development. In more developed nancial
(credit) markets it is easier for agents to borrow in case of liquidity needs, and
therefore the probability of investment liquidation is smaller, whereas in develop-
ing and emerging countries access to the world capital markets is limited.11 So
a country with a low liquidity risk can be viewed as a developed economy, and
a country with a high liquidity risk can be viewed as a developing or emerging
economy. In addition to a lower liquidity risk, a developed country can be charac-
terized by a higher expected protability (adjusted for risk) and less asymmetric
information about the productivity.
In the model, the ambiguous e¤ect of an increase in the liquidity risk on the
capital ows corresponds to the empirically observed pattern of FDI during liq-
10Chang and Velasco [18] and Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer [2]
11Freedman and Click [35]
4
uidity crises. The positive e¤ect of a higher liquidity risk on the inward FDI is
consistent with the evidence documented by Krugman [59], Aguiar and Gopinath
[4], and Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer [1]. Krugman [59] notes that the Asian
nancial crisis has been accompanied by a wave of inward direct investment. Fur-
thermore, Aguiar and Gopinath [4] analyze data on mergers and acquisitions in
East Asia between 1996 and 1998 and nd that the liquidity crisis is associated
with an inow of FDI. Moreover, Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer [1] observe that
FDI inows during nancial crises are associated with acquisitions of controlling
stakes. At the same time, my model provides a possibility of a decrease in FDI
through self-fullling expectations. This possibility is in line with the empirical
evidence12 as well as theoretical literature that associates liquidity crises with an
exit of investors from the crisis economy even if there are no shocks to fundamen-
tals (Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee [3], Chang and Velasco [18], and Caballero
and Krishnamurthy [17]).
My results are consistent with the empirical ndings that countries that are less
nancially developed and have weaker nancial institutions tend to attract more
capital in the form of FDI13. Moreover, my model can explain the phenomenon
of bilateral FDI ows among developed countries, and one-way FDI ows from
developed to emerging countries.14
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature.
Sections 3 and 4 present the theoretical model and its analysis. Sections 5 and
6 characterize the equilibrium. Sections 7 and 8 discuss the e¤ect of change in
liquidity risk on the foreign investments. Section 9 concludes the paper. All proofs
are delegated to the Appendix.
12Lipsey [63].
13Albuquerque [6], Hausman and Fernandez-Arias [43]
14Razin [70]
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1.2 Related Literature
My paper is related to several papers in the literature. My model builds on the ad-
verse selection property of FDI developed by Goldstein and Razin [39]. My model
di¤ers from their model in several aspects. I examine the portfolio choice between
two types of risky investment (direct vs portfolio) and safe asset in the two-country
"cash-in-the-market" framework where investors have the Diamond-Dybvig [27]
type of preferences (Allen and Gale [7] and Bhattacharya and Nicodano [12]).
Goldstein and Razin [39] study the choice between FDI and FPI by risk-neutral
investors in the partial equilibrium setting with a concave production function.
They show that investors with higher liquidity needs are more likely to choose FPI
over FDI. Also, they examine the implications of production costs, transparency in
the host country, and heterogeneity of foreign investors in the source country. My
model examines not only the composition of foreign investment but also the level
thereof. My paper complements the results in Goldstein and Razin [39] by ana-
lyzing the bilateral investments ows between two countries and, furthermore, the
e¤ect of the change in liquidity preferences in the host country on inward foreign
investment.
In terms of addressing the re-sale FDI phenomenon, this paper is related to
Krugman [59], Aguiar and Gopinath [4], and Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer [1].
Krugman [59] points out the re-sale FDI phenomenon and o¤ers two possible mod-
eling approaches. One is based on moral hazard and asset deation. The liabilities
of nancial intermediaries are perceived as having an implicit government guaran-
tee, and therefore subject to moral hazard problems. The excessive risky lending
inates the asset prices, which makes the nancial intermediaries seem sounder
than they actually are. During a crisis, falling asset prices make the insolvency
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of intermediaries visible, leading to further asset deation. The other explanation
is based on disintermediation and liquidation, attributing the crisis to a run on
nancial intermediaries. Such a run can be set o¤ by self-fullling expectations.
Aguiar and Gopinath [4] propose a model where foreign investors have nancial
resources to acquire domestic assets and superior technology. Acharya, Shin, and
Yorulmazer [1] address the re-sale FDI phenomenon from the rms prospective.
They provide an agency-theoretic framework in which during the crisis, the loss of
control by domestic managers together with the lack of domestic capital result in
a transfer of ownership to foreign rms.
This paper o¤ers an alternative explanation of the re-sale FDI phenomenon
based on the adverse selection. In contrast to the explanations above, in my model
a liquidity crisis may lead to a decline in FDI (through self-fullling expectations).
The following papers link nancial crises and liquidity through models of self-
fullling creditorsrun. Chang and Velasco [18] place international illiquidity at
the center of nancial crises. They argue that a small shock may result in nancial
distress, leading to costly asset liquidation, liquidity crunch, and large drop in asset
prices. Caballero and Krishnamurthy [17] argue that during a crisis self-fullling
fears of insu¢ cient collateral may trigger a capital outow.
1.3 Model
I consider a model with 2 countries: A and B. There is a continuum of agents
with an aggregate Lebesgue measure of unity. Let  be the proportion of investors
living in country A; and the rest of the investors live in country B. There are 3
time periods: t = 0; 1; 2: There is only one good in the economy, and in period zero,
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Table 1.1: Payo¤ structure.
time 0 1 2
safe asset 1! 1! 1
investment 1! 0! <ik
all agents are endowed with one unit of good that can be consumed and invested.
1.3.1 Investment Technology
Agents have access to two types of constant returns technology. One is a storage
technology (safe asset), which has zero net return: one unit of safe asset pays
out one unit of safe asset in the next period. The safe asset is the same in both
countries, and I will refer to it as "cash." The other type of technology is a long-
term risky investment project (also called risky asset). In period two, the risky
investment in project i has a random idiosyncratic payo¤<i per unit of investment
which represents idiosyncratic investment productivity. Each investor i has a choice
of starting his own investment project i by investing a fraction of his endowment,so
each project has only one owner; the productivity realizations are independent
across investments and across countries. Table 1.1 summarizes the payo¤structure.
The investment productivity of each project <ik in country k 2 fA;Bg is a
independent realization of normal distribution N(Rk; 2k) with mean Rk and vari-
ance 2k.
15 The productivity mean Rk is a random variable that takes two val-
ues: a low value Rkl with probability k and a high value Rkh with probability
(1  k)16. (For each investment project in country k; nature picks the mean
15More precisely, all portfolio investments have the same productivity mean Rpk, and all direct
investments have the same productivity mean Rdk > Rpk, as discussed in section 1.3.3
16In addition, the probability k of investment project to be less productive depends on the
type of ownership:the direct investment is less likely to have low mean productivity than the
portfolio investment, i.e., dk < pk (discussed in Section 3.3).
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Rk where Rk 2 fRkl; Rkhg.)17 The expected productivity mean is denoted by
Rk = kRkl + (1  k)Rkh with Rk > 1. All parameters of the productivity dis-
tribution are country-specic, with Rk representing the expected protability of
investment project and 2k capturing the investment risk in country k.
Agents can invest their endowment in investment projects at home (domestic
investment) and abroad (foreign investment). The holdings of the two-period risky
investment can be traded in nancial market at date t = 1.
1.3.2 Preferences
Agents consume in period 1 or 2, depending on whether they receive a liquidity
shock in period 1. The probability of receiving a liquidity shock in period one is
country-specic: investors in each country k 2 fA;Bg have the same probability
k. This probability (k) captures the liquidity risk in a given country. Investors
who receive a liquidity shock have to liquidate their risky long-term asset holdings
and consume all their wealth in period one. So they are e¤ectively early consumers
who value consumption only at date t = 1. The rest are the late consumers who
value the consumption only at date t = 2. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty,
k is also a fraction of investors hit by a liquidity shock in country k.
Investors from country k have Diamond-Dybvig type of preferences:
Uk(c1; c2) = ku(c1) + (1  k)u(c2) (1.1)
where ct is the consumption at dates t = 1; 2. In each period, investors have
17Informed investors are able to observe the true distribution, uninformed investors use the
unconditional distribution which the mixture of two normal distributions.
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mean-variance utility
E [u(ct)] = E [ct]  
2
Var [ct] (1.2)
with  representing the degree of risk aversion18. Investors choose their asset
holdings to maximize their expected utility.
Without loss of generality, I assume that country A has a smaller liquidity risk
than country B, i.e., A < B.
1.3.3 Direct and Portfolio Investments
In period t = 0, agents decide how much of their endowment to invest in long-term
risky investment projects. In a given country k, an agent can either invest directly
in a single project, or become a portfolio investor investing in up to Nk projects.19
Direct investors are able manage projects more e¢ ciently, therefore, the pro-
ductivity of direct investment is more likely to be drawn from a high mean distri-
bution than the productivity of portfolio investment, i.e., dk < pk. Therefore,
the expected protability of a direct investment
 
Rdk

is higher than the expected
protability of a portfolio investment (Rpk) per unit of investment.
Furthermore, in period one, direct investors in country k observe a signal about
their investment productivity: the true value of productivity mean Rdk. Hence-
forth, I will refer to it as the productivity signal. Portfolio investors do not observe
such productivity signal. Therefore, portfolio investors use the updating on the
18Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini [65] show that the mean-variance preferences is the
special case of variational preferences, which is a representation of preferences for decision making
under uncertainty. The mean-variance preferences have been used in the nance literature, for
example, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008).
19Due to the mean-variance preferences and idiosyncratic productivity, a portfolio investor will
always choose to invest into the maximum number of projects allowed.
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productivity mean in country k: Rpk = pkRkl + (1  pk)Rkh. The decision to
become direct or portfolio investor is country-specic, i.e., it is possible to be a
direct investor in one country, and a portfolio investor in another.
The advantage of direct investment is private information about the idiosyn-
cratic investment productivity. However, it is public knowledge which investors are
informed. This generates the adverse selection problem: it is not known whether
direct investors sell due to a liquidity shock or because they have observed the
negative productivity signal (high variance). Therefore there is an information
discount on the price of direct investment at t = 1.
In this setting, the e¢ ciency of direct over portfolio investment is reected by
higher expected productivity of the former: Rdk > Rpk. Also, the diversication
benets from portfolio investment are captured by allowing to invest in multiple
projects in one country, which is e¤ectively equivalent to reducing the investment
variance by the factor ofNk. I abstract from the other gains of management control
such as possibility of restructuring20 that may lead to an increase of investment
payo¤ from t = 1 to t = 2.
In period one, the liquidity shocks are realized, direct investors observe a signal
about the productivity of their investments, and trading in nancial market occurs.
Investors who receive a liquidity shock supply their asset holdings inelastically. In
addition, direct investors who have not received a liquidity shock but observe a
negative productivity signal can sell their investments. The buyers are investors
who have not received a liquidity shock in period one. Figure 1.1 represents the
time line of the model.
20The trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency gains related to corporate control and liquidity have been
addressed by Bolton and von Thadden [14], Maug [66], and Holmstrom and Tirole [45].
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Figure 1.1: Time line.
I show that the decision between direct and portfolio investment depends on
the probability of getting a liquidity shock and uncertainty about the investment
productivity. Agents are more likely to choose direct investment if they are less
likely to receive a liquidity shock.
1.4 InvestorsDecision Problem
Agents face the following two-stage decision problem. At date t = 0, an agent
decides whether to become a direct or a portfolio investor in each country and,
correspondingly, how much of their endowment to invest in the risky long-term
projects. At date t = 1; investors who have not received a liquidity shock, decide
how much of the long-term assets they want to buy. The decision problem of
portfolio and direct investors are illustrated in 1.2 and 1.3.
In period one, investors are restricted to buying either direct or portfolio in-
vestment in each country. This assumption is imposed to prevent further risk di-
versication. Therefore, in the equilibrium a buyer should be indi¤erent between
buying direct or portfolio investment in a given country. Note that at period t = 1
there is no advantage of private information.
Let ik 2 [0; 1] be the fraction of direct investors from country i investing in
12
Figure 1.2: Portfolio investors decision.
Figure 1.3: Direct investors decision.
country k where i; k 2 fA;Bg. Then the fraction of direct investors investing in
country k is k = Ak + (1  )Bk.
The investor who buys a risky asset from a direct investor in period t = 1,
does not know whether it is sold due to the liquidity shock or because of the low
productivity mean. Buyers believe that direct investors in country k will receive a
liquidity shock with probability
dk =
AkA + (1  )BkB
Ak + (1  )Bk . (1.3)
Therefore, the buyers believe that with probability dk
dk+(1 dk)dk direct investment
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in country k is sold due to a liquidity shock, and with probability (1 dk)dk
dk+(1 dk)dk
it sold because its low productivity. Hence, buyers believe that the productivity
mean of the asset sold by a direct investor is low Rkl with probability
(1 dk)dk
dk+(1 dk)dk
and high Rkh with probability
dk
dk+(1 dk)dk . Using Bayesian updating, the mean
of the prematurely sold direct investment in country k is
eRdk  (1  dk)dk
dk + (1  dk)dkRkl +
d
d + (1  d)Rkh; (1.4)
and its variance is 2k.
Portfolio investors do not observe a productivity signal, hence they only sell
their investment if they are hit by a liquidity shock. Therefore, the productivity of
the prematurely sold portfolio investment in country k has mean Rpk and variance
2k=Nk. Since investment productivity is idiosyncratic, there is no updating on the
productivity variance of portfolio investment based on the direct investors selling.
Several assumptions are imposed on the parameters (Rkl; Rkh; 2k; dk; pk; Nk)
of the productivity distribution for each country k21:
Assumption 1. In the absence of private information, investors are indi¤erent
between holding direct and portfolio investment. This assumption implies that
benets from diversication are perfectly o¤set by benets from management e¢ -
ciency resulting in the higher expected productivity.
Assumption 2. At t = 0, all investors invest some but not all of their endowment
in risky projects.
Assumption 3. At t = 1, investorsaggregate demand for risky assets is less
than his safe asset holdings.
21See section A.1 of the Appendix
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The investors from country i 2 fA;Bg choose their optimal investment holdings
in each country k 2 fA;Bg at date t = 0 to maximize their expected utility. Denote
by xidk the demand for direct investment at t = 0 by an investor from country i.
Similarly, denote by xipk the total demand for portfolio investment at t = 0 by an
investor from country i (this demand is divided equally among Nk projects).
At date t = 1, uncertainty about the liquidity shock is resolved and all investors
observe the total proportion of early consumers, however, their identity is private
information. Denote the prices of direct and portfolio investments in country
k 2 fA;Bg by ppk and pdk, respectively. Let ypk and ydk be the demand for direct
and portfolio investment in country k in period one. Since the liquidity shock is
realized at date t = 1, the demands ypk and ydk are the same for investors from
both countries (so superscript i can be omitted).22
The demand for direct and portfolio investments in period one are given by
ypk =
Rpk   ppk
2k=Nk
(1.5)
ydk =
eRdk   pdk
2k
where k 2 fA;Bg23. Since investors are restricted to buying either only direct
or only portfolio investment at t = 1 in a given country k, the optimal demand for
the risky asset is given by yk = max fydk; ypkg.
The optimal demand for the portfolio investment in country k by an investor
from country i in period t = 0 is given by
22The demand for risky asset at t = 1 is independent from investment demand at t = 0 due to
the mean-variance preferences and assumption 2. Since after the realization of liquidity shock,
the survived investors from both countries are identical, and their demands for each type of the
risky asset is the same: yApk = y
B
pk and y
A
dk = y
B
dk.
23See Appendix A.2 for maximization problem.
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xipk =
 
Rpk   1
  i  Rpk   ppk
(1  i) 2k=Nk
(1.6)
The optimal demand for the direct investment in country k by an investor from
country i in period t = 0 is given by
xidk =
(Rkh   1)  i (Rkh   pdk)
(1  i) 2k
(1.7)
Note that the demand for risky investment (both direct and portfolio) at t = 0
is a decreasing function of liquidity risk (i), i.e., investors from a country with a
lower liquidity risk will allocate a larger fraction of their endowment to risky assets
in period zero. Also, the demand for risky investment is an increasing function of
the price of the investment at t = 1., i.e., agents will invest a larger amount of
their endowment into risky projects if the re-sale price in the next period is higher.
1.5 Equilibrium
Recall that ik 2 [0; 1] denotes the fraction of direct investors from country i
investing in country k, where i; k 2 fA;Bg.
Given the fractions (ik : i; k 2 fA;Bg) of direct investors in the economy,
prices (ppk; pdk) and demand functions
 
xipk; x
i
dk; yk

for all i; k 2 fA;Bg, constitute
a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) if (i) (xidk; yk) (respectively, (x
i
pk; yk))
maximizes the expected utility of a direct (respectively, portfolio) investor i, given
the prices (pdk; ppk) and (ii) the market for investments clears at t = 1.
The overall equilibrium in the economy is given by
 
ik; (pdk; ppk) ; (x
i
dk; x
i
pk; yk)

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for i; k 2 fA;Bg.
1.5.1 Properties of Equilibrium
Property 1. In an equilibrium, the prices satisfy pdk  1 and ppk  1.
If the price of direct investment in country k is greater than one then agents
will invest all of their endowment in this country. Then there is no safe asset
holding in period one, therefore pdk > 1 cannot be an equilibrium price. Similarly,
for portfolio investment.
Property 2. In an equilibrium, the optimal demands for portfolio and direct
investments are equal: eRdk   pdk
2k
=
Rpk   ppk
2k=N
(1.8)
Given the assumption that investors can buy only one type of asset in each
country, the expected utilities of buying direct and portfolio investments should
be equal in the equilibrium. Otherwise, all investors will only buy the investment
with higher expected utility.
Property 3. In an equilibrium, a direct investor sells his investment if he
observes a negative productivity signal.
Suppose a direct investor does not sell his investment after observing a negative
signal. Then by Assumption 3, ex-ante the investor is better o¤ by choosing the
portfolio investment at t = 0 since he can sell it for a higher price at t = 1 in case
of a liquidity shock.
The equilibrium prices of direct investment (pdk) and portfolio investment (ppk)
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are determined by equation (1.8) and the market clearing condition (1.9).
( (1  A) + (1  ) (1  B)) yk
=
0BBBBBBB@
Ak (A + (1  A)k)xAdk
+(1  ) Bk (B + (1  B)k)xBdk
+ (1  Ak)AxApk
+(1  ) (1  Bk)BxBpk
1CCCCCCCA
(1.9)
In each country k, risky investment is supplied by the agents who received a liq-
uidity shock or the adverse signal about investment productivity. The buyers are
the agents who have not received a liquidity shock.
1.5.2 Choice between Direct and Portfolio Investments
In period t = 0, an investor from country i chooses to become a direct investor in
country k only if his expected utility from holding direct investment is greater than
or equal to his expected utility from holding portfolio investment: EU (xidk) 
EU
 
xipk

. If the two utilities are equal then an investor is indi¤erent between
holding direct or portfolio investment.
Recall that the liquidity risk in country A is less than in country B: A < B:
Lemma 1. For any country k 2 fA;Bg, if some investors from country B
hold direct investment in country k, i.e., Bk > 0, then all investors from country
A hold direct investment in country k, i.e., Ak = 1.
Lemma 1 follows from the fact that the demand for risky investment is a de-
creasing function in liquidity risk. This lemma implies that if some investors from
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country A (but not all) choose to hold direct investment in country k, then none of
the investors from country B hold direct investment in that country. In particular,
if for investors from country A the expected utility from holding direct invest-
ment is less than the expected utility from holding portfolio investment, then only
portfolio investments will be held in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exist an equilibrium. For each country k 2 fA;Bg, there
are two possible types of equilibria. In type I, Ak 2 [0; 1) and Bk = 0, i.e., only
investors from country A (but not all) hold direct investment; the equilibrium of
this type is unique. In type II, Ak = 1 and Bk 2 [0; 1], i.e., all investors from
country A hold direct investment; there are at most three such equilibria.
Type I equilibrium includes the (corner) equilibrium with portfolio investments
only and a pooling equilibrium for investors from country A. The equilibrium of
type I is unique because there is a strategic substitutability in becoming a direct
investor. Therefore, there is a unique equilibrium Ak such that if the proportion
of direct investors is below Ak then EU
 
xAdk

> EU
 
xApk

; and if the proportion
of direct investors is above Ak then EU
 
xAdk

< EU
 
xApk

.
Type II equilibrium includes the (corner) equilibrium with direct investments
only, a pooling equilibrium for investors from country B, and the separating equi-
librium where direct investments are held by investors from country A and portfolio
investments are held by investors in country B.
The multiplicity of type II equilibria is based on the e¤ect of expectations on
the price of prematurely sold direct investment. On one hand, similarly to the
type I equilibrium, as the fraction of direct investors Bk increases, the price of
direct investment goes down in country k, decreasing the benets from holding
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direct investment. On the other hand, the information discount on the price of
direct investment depends on the probability of direct investors selling due to the
negative productivity signal. If there are more direct investors with a high liquidity
risk then the market believes that the probability of a direct investor selling due
to a liquidity shock is higher and, therefore, the price discount on the prematurely
sold direct investment is smaller. So, more investors from country B choose to
hold direct investment if they believe that other investors from country B are
holding direct investment. This strategic complementarity among direct investors
generates multiple equilibria. If there are two or three equilibria then one of the
equilibria is a separating equilibrium where all investors with a low liquidity risk
hold direct investment, and all investors with a high liquidity risk hold portfolio
investment.
Overall, there are ve possible cases of composition of direct and portfolio
investment that can occur in the equilibrium in a given country:
1. investors from both countries hold portfolio investments;
2. some investors from country A hold direct investments and others hold port-
folio investments;
3. all investors from country A hold direct investments and all investors from
country B hold portfolio investments;
4. some investors from country B hold portfolio investments and others hold
direct investments;
5. investors from both countries hold direct investments.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the possible equilibria regions for di¤erent values of A
and B such that A < B. Each point in the (A; B) plane corresponds to
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a particular case of equilibria in the enumeration above, except for the points
with multiple equilibria (when cases 3 and 4 occur simultaneously). Thus, each
type corresponds to a region in the plane; these regions are colored distinctly
and numbered accordingly. We consider three examples with the same values of
Rh = 1:2; Rl = 0:9; 
2 = 0:1; p = d = 0:5; N = 1 and di¤erent values of  (the
fraction of investors in country A). Note that as  becomes larger the area with
multiple equilibria disappears.
Figure 1.4: Possible equilibria regions for di¤erent values of A and B.
1.6 Composition of Foreign Investment
Dene the foreign direct investment from country A to country B as the holdings
of direct investment in country B by investors from country A: FDIAB = AxAdB.
Similarly, dene the foreign portfolio investment from country A to country B as
the holdings of portfolio investment in country B by investors from country A:
FPIAB =  (1  A)xApB. Then the foreign investment from country A to country
B is FIAB = AxAdB+ (1  A)xApB. Dene FDIBA, FPIBA, and FIBA similarly.
There are two dimensions in which the two countries may di¤er. One is the liq-
uidity risk (k), another is the distribution parameters of investment productivity
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that represent the countrys fundamentals: (Rkl; Rkh; 2k; dk; pk; Nk).
There are two possible interpretations of liquidity risk in my model. One is the
probability of a liquidity crisis that is unrelated to fundamentals of the economy.
Another is a measure of nancial market development: in more developed nancial
markets it is easier for agents to borrow in case of liquidity needs, therefore the
probability of investment liquidation is smaller. Accordingly, a country with a low
liquidity risk can be viewed as a developed country, and a country with a high
liquidity risk can be viewed as a developing or emerging economy.
Suppose the countries di¤er only in terms of liquidity risk and are identical
with respect to productivity parameters. In this case, the country with a higher
liquidity risk attracts less foreign investment, but a higher share of it in the form
of FDI. Figures 1.5 illustrates the possible compositions of bilateral investment
holdings in the di¤erent types of equilibria.
Figure 1.5: Bilateral investment holdings in di¤erent types of equilibria: type I
pooling equilibrium, separating equilibrium, type II pooling equilibrium.
In addition to a lower liquidity risk, a developed country can be characterized
by a higher expected payo¤ (adjusted for risk) and smaller benets from private
information of FDI.
Property 4. In an equilibrium, the share of FDI from country i to country k
is higher if either of the following holds: (i) e¢ ciency gains of direct investment 
Rdk  Rpk

are larger, (ii) uncertainty about investment productivity (Rkh  Rkl)
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is larger, (iii) risk diversication opportunities (Nk) are smaller.
Both FDI and FPI holdings are larger if in the host country the expected
protability is higher and the investment risk is lower. The larger uncertainty
about investment productivity positively a¤ects the share of direct investments
relative to portfolio investments since the benets from private information are
larger. If direct investment is more e¢ cient relative to portfolio investment, then
the share of direct investments is higher, which corresponds to higher equilibrium
levels of Ak and Bk. On the other hand, larger diversication benets from
portfolio investment result in a smaller share of FDI.
My results are consistent with the empirical ndings that countries that are
less nancially developed and have weaker nancial institutions tend to attract
more capital in the form of FDI. This o¤ers a liquidity-based explanation of the
phenomenon of bilateral FDI ows among developed countries and one-way FDI
ows from developed to emerging countries.
Moreover, Freedman and Click [35] show that banks in developing countries
maintain a high level of liquid assets, while allocating only a modest amount of
funds to productive businesses through loans. They argue that this di¤erence
among developed and developing countries is due to ine¢ ciencies in credit markets
resulting from factors such as greater macroeconomic risk and signicant decien-
cies in the legal and regulatory environment.
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1.7 Liquidity Risk
In this section, I study the e¤ect of change in the liquidity risk () on investment
holdings in each country. First, I examine how the composition of foreign invest-
ment is a¤ected by an increase in the liquidity risk in the host country.(comparative
statics).Next, I introduce aggregate uncertainty about liquidity risk and analyze
how the investment holding and prices are a¤ected.
1.7.1 Comparative Statics
In this section, I analyze how the composition of foreign investment is a¤ected by
an increase in the liquidity risk in the host country.
Consider country A as a host country and country B as a source country.
Suppose countryA is in the type II pooling equilibria with respect to inward foreign
investment, that is, it has inows of both FDI and FPI. In this case, an increase
in the liquidity risk in the host country (A) leads to a lower level of total foreign
investment. The e¤ect on the composition of foreign investment is ambiguous
and depends on the equilibrium. If economy is in the unique equilibrium then
an increase in A leads to more FDI and less FPI. However, if there are multiple
equilibria then FDI may increase or decrease depending on the equilibrium.
As the liquidity risk increases, two e¤ects take place. First, market liquidity is
reduced reecting the higher preference for safe liquid asset. This leads to lower
level of foreign investment including FDI. At the same time, it reduces the adverse
selection problem associated with direct investments: the fraction of FDI lemons
is lower. This results in a smaller information discount on FDI, and therefore, leads
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to a higher level of FDI.
If there are multiple equilibria and the economy is in the equilibrium with a
larger fraction of direct investors (BA) or if the equilibrium is unique, then the
second e¤ect dominates and an increase in liquidity risk in the host country leads
to a higher level of FDI. If the economy is in the equilibrium with a smaller fraction
of direct investors (BA) then the rst e¤ect dominates and, therefore, an increase
in liquidity risk in the host country leads to a lower level of FDI. In this case, the
outow of FDI is associated with self-fullling expectations: if an agent expects less
agents to hold direct investments, then he chooses not to hold direct investment
himself.
A similar argument applies to the case when country B is a host country. These
results are summarized in the Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Suppose country k 2 fA;Bg is in type II pooling equilibrium with
respect to inward foreign investment. Then (i) if there is a unique equilibrium then
an increase in liquidity risk results in a higher level of FDI; (ii) if there are multiple
equilibria then an increase in liquidity risk results in a higher level of FDI in one
equilibrium, and a lower level of FDI in another.
1.7.2 Aggregate Uncertainty about Liquidity Risk
Suppose there are two aggregate liquidity states (kL; kH) for the host country
such that kL < kH . The state kH is a crisis state where the fraction of investors
hit by a liquidity shock is larger. These states are realized with ex-ante probabilities
(1   q) and q. Consider again country A as a host country, then the model by a
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normal state SL = (AL; B) and a crisis state SH = (AH ; B) where AH > AL.
All investment decisions at t = 0, such as fractions of direct investors (Ak; Bk)
and direct and portfolio investment holdings
 
xAdk; x
A
pk; x
B
dk; x
B
pk

, are made before
liquidity state S is realized. However, it a¤ects the prices and demands for direct
and portfolio investments in period one depend on which state is realized.
There are two ways in which the prices are a¤ected, one is through the market
liquidity and another is through the adverse selection problem associated with di-
rect investment. The rst e¤ect is the dry up of market liquidity as more investors
have to sell their asset holdings, and fewer investors are buying. Therefore, invest-
ment prices fall in order to clear the market. At the same time, direct investments
are more likely to be sold before maturity due to a liquidity shock rather than
because of the adverse productivity signal. Therefore, the market belief about
the probability of receiving a liquidity shock (d) is higher than in a crisis state
relative to a normal state. This reduces the adverse selection problem and results
in a smaller information discount on direct investment.
Then the depressed prices together with the reduced discount on direct in-
vestment capture the phenomenon of re-sale FDI. The lower prices reect the
di¢ culty of nding buyers during the crisis. Aguiar and Gopinath [4] show that
during the Asian nancial crisis in late 1990s the median ratio of o¤er price to
book value substantially declined. The low liquidity of domestic investors led to
the signicant increase in acquisitions involving foreign investors.
Next suppose that probability of a crisis depends on the previously realized
state. So that conditional probability of transition from a normal state to a crises
state is smaller than the conditional probability of remaining in a crisis state. The
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transition matrix is given by
264 1  qLH qLH
1  qHH qHH
375 where qHH > qLH .
Then we can compare the equilibria sequentially, and analyze how the composi-
tion of foreign investment depends on the expectation of a liquidity crisis. Similarly
to the comparative statics with respect to an increase in liquidity risk, a higher ex-
pectation of a liquidity crisis has two e¤ects. One is reduced market liquidity since
investorspreferences for liquidity are higher. Another is a smaller information
discount on the prematurely sold direct investment. The rst e¤ect leads to less
FDI while the second e¤ect results in more FDI. . If there is a unique equilibrium,
then second e¤ect (reduced adverse selection) dominates so higher liquidity risk
leads to a higher level of FDI. If, however, there are multiple equilibria, higher
liquidity risk may lead to a lower level of FDI.
Figure 1.6 illustrates the e¤ect of an increase in probability of a liquidity crisis
q on foreign direct and portfolio investment.
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Figure 1.6: FDIBA and FPIBA as functions of probability of the crisis state s.
The results can be related to the empirically observed pattern of FDI during
liquidity crises, as discussed in the following section.
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Figure 1.7: Crises in Korea and Mexico: inow of FDI and outow of FPI (millions
of 2006 U.S. dollars).
1.8 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I consider the empirical data on foreign investment during the
episodes of liquidity crises. The capital ows data is from the Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006) dataset.24
On one hand, the positive e¤ect of a higher liquidity risk on the inward FDI is
consistent with the evidence of re-sale FDI. Figure 1.7 shows the FDI and FPI
ows into South Korea and Mexico in the time period around their respective
nancial crises in late 1990s and 1994.25
Both Korea and Mexico can be viewed as a country B (a country with higher
liquidity risk) in my model, and the nancial crises can be interpreted as the
increase in liquidity risk B. Then, according to my model, if a country is in type I
equilibria with respect to inward foreign investment, then the higher liquidity risk
24They construct estimates of external assets and liabilities, distinguishing between foreign
direct investment, portfolio equity investment, o¢ cial reserves, and external debt for over 140
countries over the period of 1970-2004.
25The East Asian nancial crisis started in Thailand with the nancial collapse of the Thai
baht in 1997. Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines were the most a¤ected by
the crisis.
The Mexican (Tequila) crisis was triggered by the sudden devaluation of the Mexican peso in
December, 1994.
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leads to more FDI and less FPI. If a country is in type II equilibria with respect
to inward foreign investment, then an increase in liquidity risk results in a higher
level of FDI in one of the equilibria. As we can see from the gure, in Korea during
the late 1990s crisis and in Mexico following the 1994 crisis the FDI level has been
increasing while FPI level has declined.
Furthermore, the insurge of FDI during liquidity crises is supported by empir-
ical evidence on mergers and acquisitions in crises-stricken countries. Analyzing
rm-level dataset on mergers and acquisitions in countries that underwent the
Asian nancial crises in late 1990s, Aguiar and Gopinath [4] nd that during the
crisis foreign acquisitions increased by 91% while domestic acquisitions declined
by 27%. Moreover, Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer [1] observe that FDI inows
during nancial crises are associated with acquisitions of stakes that grant control
and, furthermore, the assets acquired in re sales are subsequently re-sold quickly
(ipped) to domestic buyers once the crisis has past.
On the other hand, my model provides a possibility of a decrease in FDI through
self-fullling expectations. This possibility is consistent with the behavior of FDI
during the early 1990s crisis in Sweden26 and the 2001 crisis in Argentina27. As
Figure 1.8 shows, FDI has declined in both countries.
Sweden can be viewed as a country A. Suppose it is in the type II pooling
equilibria with respect to inward foreign investment, that is, it has inows of both
FDI and FPI. If there are multiple equilibria then an increase in A may leads to
less FDI and more FPI depending on the equilibrium.
Argentina can be viewed as a country B. If it is in type II equilibria with
26The Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in Scandinavia in early 1990s.
27Argentina defaults in December 2001.
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Figure 1.8: Crises in Sweden and Argentina: outow of FDI (millions of 2006 U.S.
dollars).
respect to inward foreign investment, then it has inows only of FDI. Then an
increase in the country liquidity risk B may result in a lower level of FDI in one
of the equilibria. The level of FPI into Argentina in early 2000s is almost at zero.
1.9 Conclusion
I analyze the composition of foreign investment between two countries which may
di¤er in two dimensions: liquidity risk (probability of a liquidity crisis) and the
investment productivity (fundamentals). I nd that the country with a higher liq-
uidity risk attracts less foreign investment, but a higher share of it is in the form
of FDI. Also, a country with a larger uncertainty about investment productivity
attracts more FDI relative to FPI since the marginal benets from private infor-
mation are larger. This is consistent with the empirical ndings that countries
that are less nancially developed attract more capital in the form of FDI. This
o¤ers an explanation based on the di¤erence in liquidity risk for the phenomenon
of bilateral FDI ows among developed countries and one-way FDI ows from
developed to emerging countries.
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The e¤ect on FDI of an increase in liquidity risk in the host country is am-
biguous. If the economy is in the unique equilibrium then a higher liquidity risk
leads to larger FDI holdings and smaller FPI holdings. This result is in line with
the re-sale FDI phenomenon. If, however, there are multiple equilibria then a
higher liquidity risk may lead to the opposite e¤ect: FDI declines. In this case, an
outow of FDI is induced by self-fullling expectations. This ambiguous impact of
increased liquidity risk on foreign investment corresponds to the empirical evidence
on capital ows during liquidity crises.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ROLE OF ADVERSE SELECTION AND LIQUIDITY IN
FINANCIAL CRISIS
2.1 Introduction
In the current crisis of 2007-2008, the market for securities backed by subprime
mortgages was the rst to su¤er the sudden dry up in liquidity. Some of the possi-
ble explanations for illiquidity were the lack of transparency and the information
asymmetries about the true value of the assets. In particular, the di¢ culty in
assessing the fundamental value of the security may lead to the adverse selection.
Banks created structured nancial products referred to as collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs). CDOs were formed from diversied portfolios of mortgages
and other types of assets such as corporate bonds, credit cards and auto loans. The
pooled portfolios were sliced into di¤erent tranches which have been prioritized in
how they absorb losses from the underlying portfolio. The top tranches were
constructed to receive an AAA rating, these tranches were the rst to paid out of
the cash ows and were widely considered to be safe. The most junior "equity"
tranche (also referred to as "toxic waste") were to be paid out only after all other
tranches have been paid. The junior tranches were usually held by the issuing
bank; they were traded infrequently and were therefore hard to value.1 Also,
these structured nance products received overly optimistic ratings from the credit
rating agencies. One of the reason the underlying securities default risks were
underestimated is that the statistical models were based on the historically low
mortgage default and delinquency rates.(Brunnermeier [16])
1Brunnermeier [16]
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CDOs written on subprime mortgages had skewed payo¤s: they o¤ered high ex-
pected return in most states of nature but su¤ered catastrophic losses in extremely
bad states. When economy is in a normal state with strong fundamentals, the
asymmetric information does not signicantly a¤ect the value of mortgage backed
securities (MBS). However, when an economy is subject to a negative shock, the
value of the security becomes more sensitive to private information and the adverse
selection may inuence the trading decisions. (Morris and Shin [67]) When in Feb-
ruary 2007 subprime mortgage defaults had increased,2 a large fraction of CDOs
were downgraded3. The impact of declining housing prices on MBS depended on
the exact composition of mortgages that backed the securities. Due to the com-
plexity of structured nancial products and heterogeneity of the underlying asset
pool, the owners have an informational advantage in estimating how much those
securities are worth. This asymmetric information about the true value of the
asset generates the lemons problem4: a buyer does not know whether the seller is
selling the security because of a sudden need for liquidity, or because the seller is
trying to get rid of the toxic assets. This adverse selection issue can lead to the
market illiquidity reecting buyersbeliefs that most securities o¤ered for sale are
of low quality.
The ight to liquidity can amplify the e¤ect of adverse selection during the crisis
leading to the increased asset price volatility and possibly to a complete breakdown
of trading. As market liquidity falls, it becomes di¢ cult to nd trading partners
which leads to a re-sale pricing.5 The deleveraging that accompanies the initial
2This increase in subprime mortgage defaults triggered the liquidity crisis in February 2007.
(Brunnermeier [16])
3"27 of the 30 tranches of asset-backed collateralized debt obligations underwritten by Merrill
Lynch in 2007, saw their triple-A ratings downgraded to junkOverall, in 2007, Moodys down-
graded 31 percent of all tranches for asset-backed collateralized debt obligations it had rated and
14 percent of those initially rated AAA." (Coval, J. Jurek, and E. Sta¤ord [25])
4Akerlof (1970)
5The haircut on ABSs increased from 3-5% in August 2007 to 50-60% in August 2008. The
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shock can further aggravate the adverse selection problem.6 Because of the losses
on their MBS, some banks became undercapitalized; however, their attempts to
recapitalize push their market price further down. This reects the investorsfear
that any bank that issues new equity or debt may be overvalued, leading to the
liquidity crunch.
In this paper, I develop a model that illustrates how adverse selection in an
asset market can lead to an equilibrium with no trade during the crisis. Also, I
analyze the role of market liquidity and the role of expectations in amplifying the
e¤ect of adverse selection.
In my model, agents have the Diamond-Dybvig7 type of preferences: they
consume in period one or in period two, depending on whether they receive a
liquidity shock in period one. In period zero, investors choose how much to invest
into risky long-term assets which have idiosyncratic payo¤s. In period one, liquidity
shocks are realized and, subsequently, risky investments are traded in the nancial
market. The late consumers (who have not experienced a liquidity shock) are the
buyers in the nancial market.
I begin by examining the portfolio choice when investors have private infor-
mation about their investment payo¤ and it is public information which investors
have received a liquidity shock. Then I analyze the situation when the identity
of investors hit by a liquidity shock is private information. In the latter case, in-
vestors can take advantage of their private information by selling the low-payo¤
haircut on equities increased from 15% to 20% for the same period. (Gorton and Metrick (2009))
6"The large haircuts on some securities could be seen as a response by leveraged entitites to
the potential drying up of trading possibilities in the asset-backed securities (ABS) market. The
equity market, in contrast, is populated mainly with non-leveraged entities such as mutual funds,
pension funds, insurance companies and households, and hence is less vulnerable to the drying
up of trading partners." Morris and Shin [67]
7Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
34
investments and keeping the ones with high payo¤s. This leads to the lemons
problem. If market is liquid then informed investors can gain from trading on pri-
vate information by pretending to be liquidity traders (investors who experienced
a liquidity shock). However, if the fraction of low quality assets o¤ered for sale is
large then the adverse selection can lead to the market illiquidity.
Following the Allen and Gale "cash-in-the-market" framework8, in my model
liquidity depends on the amount of the safe asset held by the investors that is
available to buy risky assets from liquidity traders. The market liquidity (demand
for risky investments in the interim period) depends on the investors liquidity
preference. Allen and Gale [8] show that the "cash-in-the-market" pricing leads
to the market prices below fundamentals if the preference for liquidity is high.
I demonstrate that the presence of adverse selection in the market can further
depress the market prices exacerbating the asset price volatility.
I show that if a crisis is accompanied by the ight to liquidity, the e¤ect of
adverse selection can be amplied leading to the re-sale pricing or a breakdown
of trade during the crisis. Furthermore, I show that underestimating the likelihood
of the crisis can aggravate the adverse selection e¤ect as well. Next, I analyze the
investment choice from the central planner prospective. The central planner can
improve upon the market allocation by eliminating the lemons problem.
8The amount of cash in the market depends on the participants liquidity preference. The
higher the average liquidity preference of investors in the market, the greater is the average level
of the safe assets in portfolios and the greater is the market ability to absorb liquidity trading
without large price changes. (Allen and Gale [7])
35
2.2 Model
I consider a model with three dates indexed by t = 0; 1; 2. There is a continuum
of ex-ante identical agents with an aggregate Lebesgue measure of unity. There is
only one good in the economy that can be used for consumption and investment.
All agents are endowed with one unit of good at date t = 0, and nothing at the
later dates.
2.2.1 Preferences
Agents consume at date one or two, depending on whether they receive a liquidity
shock at date one. The probability of receiving a liquidity shock in period one is
denoted by . So  is also a fraction of investors hit by a liquidity shock. Investors
who receive a liquidity shock have to liquidate their risky long-term asset holdings
and consume all their wealth in period one. So they are e¤ectively early consumers
who value consumption only at date t = 1. I will also refer to them as liquidity
traders. The rest are the late consumers who value the consumption only at date
t = 2.
Investors have Diamond-Dybvig type of preferences:
U(c1; c2) = u(c1) + (1  )u(c2) (2.1)
where ct is the consumption at dates t = 1; 2. In each period, investors have
logarithmic utility: u(ct) = log ct.
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2.2.2 Investment Technology
Agents have access to two types of constant returns investment technologies. One
is a storage technology (also called the safe asset or cash), which has zero net
return: one unit of safe asset pays out one unit of safe asset in the next period.
Another type of technology is a long-term risky investment project (also called
a risky asset). In period two, the risky investment in project i has a random
idiosyncratic payo¤ Ri per unit of investment. Each investor i has a choice of
starting his own investment project i by investing a fraction of his endowment.
The investor can start only one project, and each project has only one owner; the
payo¤ realizations are independent across investments.
The payo¤ of each investment i is an independent realization of a random
variable Ri that takes two values: a low value RL with probability s and a high
value RH with probability (1  s) where s 2 f1; 2g. There are two states of nature
s = 1 and s = 2 that are revealed at t = 1. The state 1 is a normal state where
the fraction of low quality assets is small:  = 1. The state 2 is a crisis state
with a signicantly larger fraction of low quality assets:  = 2 > 1. Also, s is
a fraction of investments with low payo¤ in state s. These states are realized with
ex-ante probabilities (1   q) and q. I will also use the notation q1 = 1   q and
q2 = q.
The expected payo¤ of each individual risky project in state s is denoted by
Rs = sRL + (1  s)RH with RL < 1 < RH . The expected payo¤ is denoted
by R = (1  q)R1 + qR2 with R > 1. The long-term asset can be liquidated
prematurely at date t = 1, in this case, one unit of the risky asset yields r units
of the good, where RL < r < 1. The holdings of the two-period risky asset can
be traded in nancial market at date t = 1. Table 2.1 summarizes the payo¤
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Table 2.1: Payo¤ structure.
time 0 1 2
safe asset 1! 1! 1
investment 1! r ! Ri
structure.
The following assumptions on asset returns parameters are maintained through-
out.
Assumption 1. RL < 1 < RH .
Assumption 2. (1  q)R1 + qR2 > 1
This assumption ensures that a risky investment is always more productive
than the safe asset.
Assumption 3. r  r =
X
s=1;2
qs
RL((1 )RH+Rs)+RH(1 )(1 s)(RH RL)
((1 )RH+Rs+(1 )(1 s)(RH RL))
This assumption rules out the situation when a risky asset dominates the safe
asset at t = 1. If r < r then the market price at t = 1 is greater than one, therefore,
no one will choose to hold the safe asset at t = 0. In particular, this assumption
implies that r > RL.
Assumption 4. r  r : EU(p (r) ; x (r))  (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs log
 
Rs=p (r)

This assumption rules out the situation when the safe asset dominates a risky
asset at t = 1. If r > r then the return on the risky asset bought at t = 1 is higher
that the return on investment made at t = 0, so no one will choose to invest in
risky projects at t = 0. In particular, this assumption implies that r < 1:
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2.2.3 Information
At date t = 0, investors make investment choices between the two technologies,
safe and risky, in proportion x and (1   x) respectively. They choose their asset
holdings to maximize their expected utility.
At date t = 1, the liquidity shocks and the aggregate state are realized, and
the nancial market opens. If investors have not received a liquidity shock, they
privately observe the payo¤ of investment they own. The supply of the risky asset
comes from the investors who have experienced a liquidity shock. The demand for
risky asset comes from investors who have not received a liquidity shock.
I will consider two cases. In the rst case, it is public information which investor
have experienced a liquidity shock. If an investor gets a liquidity shock, he sells or
liquidates his holdings of the risky asset in order to consume as much as possible
in period one. If an investor is not hit by a liquidity shock and learns that his
investment has low payo¤, he can liquidate it, receiving r units of the good per
unit of investment.
In the second case, the identity of investors hit by a liquidity shock is private
information. Therefore, after observing investment payo¤s, agents can take ad-
vantage of this private information by selling low quality projects in the market
at date t=1. In this case, buyers are not able to distinguish whether an investor
is selling his asset holdings because of its low payo¤ or because of the liquidity
needs. This generates adverse selection problem, and leads to the discount on the
investments sold before maturity.
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2.3 Equilibrium
2.3.1 Equilibrium without Adverse Selection
First, I consider the case where the identity of investors hit by a liquidity shock is
public information. Therefore, there is no adverse selection. All risky assets at t=1
are sold by liquidity traders who cannot wait for the maturity of their investments
at date t = 2.
Since all the investments have idiosyncratic payo¤s, the expected payo¤ of the
risky asset sold in period one is Rs in state s. All risky assets sold at t = 1 are
aggregated in the market, hence, the variance of the asset bought at date t = 1 is
zero. Therefore, the return on risky asset bought in period one is Rs=ps, where ps
is the market price in state s. The late consumers will be willing to buy risky asset
at date t = 1 if the market price ps is less than the expected payo¤Rs. The earlier
consumers will be willing to sell their projects if the market price ps is greater than
the liquidation value r.
At date t = 0, investors choose the investment allocations between the risky
and safe technologies, in proportion x and (1 x) respectively, in order to maximize
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their expected utility.
 log c1 + (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs (s log c2L (s) + (1  s) log c2H (s)) (2.2)
s:t: (i) c1 (s) =
8><>: 1  x+ psx if ps  r1  x+ rx if ps < r
(ii) c2H (s) =
8><>: xRH + ysRs if ps  rxRH + (1  x) if ps < r
(iii) c2L (s) =
8><>: xr + ysRs if ps  rxr + (1  x) if ps < r
The consumption of early consumers in state s is denoted by c1 (s) and the
consumption of late consumers in state s is denoted by c2j (s) where j = L;H
refers to payo¤ of an investment project i.
The late consumers will be willing to buy risky assets at t = 1 if the market
price p is less than the expected payo¤ R. Therefore, the demand for risky asset
at t = 1 in state s is given by
y (s) =
8><>:
1 x
ps
if ps  Rs
0 if ps > Rs
(2.3)
Therefore, the aggregate demand at t = 1 in state s is given by
D (s) =
8><>: (1  )
1 x
ps
if ps  Rs
0 if ps > Rs
(2.4)
The earlier consumers will be willing to sell their projects if the market price
p is greater than the liquidation value r. Therefore, the aggregate supply at t = 1
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in state s is given by
S (s) =
8><>: x if ps  r0 if ps < r (2.5)
The price in state is determined by the market clearing conditions:
xps = (1  ) (1  x)
Since the investment allocations are determined at t = 0 and there are no
aggregate uncertainty about the probability of a liquidity shock , the price of the
risky asset sold at t=1 is the same in both states: p1 = p2  p where
p =
(1  )

(1  x)
x
Proposition 3 If assumption 1-4 are satised, then there exists a unique equi-
librium, and the equilibrium allocation into long-term risky investment x and the
market price of investment sold at date one p are given by
p =
+
X
s=1;2
qs

s
Rs
r+Rs

(1 )
+ (1  s) RsRH+Rs (1 )

+
X
s=1;2
qs

s
r
r+Rs

(1 )
+ (1  s) RHRH+Rs (1 )
 (2.6)
x =
8>>>><>>>>:
(1  )
 
+
X
s=1;2
qs

s
r
(r+Rs 1 )
+ (1  s) RH(RH+Rs 1 )
!
if p  r
(1  )
 
1 
X
s=1;2
qss
!
1
(1 r)+
 
+ (1  )
X
s=1;2
qss
!
1
(1 RH) if p < r
(2.7)
Furthermore, the investment allocation and welfare are larger in the market equi-
librium (when p  r) relative to an equilibrium with no trade (when p < r) :
The equilibrium consumption of early consumers is the same in both states and
is given by:
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c1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
 
+ (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs

s
Rs
(1 )r+Rs + (1  s)
Rs
(1 )RH+Rs
!
if p  r 
+ (1  )
X
s=1;2
qss
!
RH r
RH 1 if p < r
(2.8)
The consumption of late consumers with low payo¤ investment in state s is
given by
c2L (s)=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(1  )

r + 1 Rs
 
+
X
s=1;2
qs

s
r
r+Rs

1 
+ (1  s) RHRH+Rs 1 
! if p  r
 
+ (1  )
X
s=1;2
qss
!
RH r
RH 1 if p < r
(2.9)
The consumption of late consumers with high payo¤ investment in state s is
given by
c2H (s)=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(1  )

RH +

1 Rs
 
+
X
s=1;2
qs

s
r
r+Rs

1 
+ (1  s) RHRH+Rs 1 
! if p  r
(1  )
 
1 
X
s=1;2
qss
!
RH r
1 r if p < r
(2.10)
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2.3.2 Equilibrium with Adverse Selection
Now suppose the identity of investors who have received a liquidity shock is pri-
vate information. Therefore, after observing investment payo¤, agents can take
advantage of this private information by selling low productive investments in the
market at date t=1. This generates the adverse selection problem and therefore,
leads to the discount on the price of risky assets sold at t = 1. Investors always
can choose to liquidate the project if it yield a low payo¤.
The investor who buys a risky asset at date t = 1, does not know whether it is
sold due to the liquidity shock or because of its low payo¤. The buyers believe that
with probability  investment is sold due to a liquidity shock, and with probability
(1  ) (1  s) it sold because of the low payo¤. Hence, buyers believe that the
payo¤ of the prematurely sold risky assets in state s is eRs such that
eRs = 
+ (1  )sRs +
(1  )s
+ (1  )sRL (2.11)
The late consumers will be willing to buy risky asset at t=1 if the market price
p is less than the expected payo¤ eR. Therefore, the demand for risky asset at t = 1
is given by
ys =
8><>:
1 x
ps
if ps < eRs
0 if ps > eRs (2.12)
The earlier consumers will be willing to sell their projects if the market price
ps is greater than the liquidation value r.
The price in state s is determined by market clearing conditions:
(+ (1  )s)xps = (1  ) (1  x) (2.13)
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Therefore, the market price in state s can be expressed as
ps =
(1  )
(+ (1  )s)
(1  x)
x
(2.14)
Note, that the price is no longer the same in both states since the fraction of
low productive investments is larger in a crisis state: 2 > 1. Therefore, the price
in the crisis state is lower than the price in the normal state: p2 < p1:
Investors choose their asset holdings (x; 1  x) to maximize their expected util-
ity:
 log c1 + (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs (s log c2L (s) + (1  s) log c2H (s)) (2.15)
s:t: (i) c1 (s) =
8><>: 1  x+ psx if ps  r1  x+ rx if ps < r
(ii) c2H (s) =
8><>: xRH + (1  x)
eRs=ps if ps  r
xRH + (1  x) if ps < r
(iii) c2L (s) =
8><>: xp+ (1  x)
eRs=ps if ps  r
xr + (1  x) if ps < r
Proposition 4 If assumptions 1-4 are satised then there exists a unique equilib-
rium. There are three possible equilibrium types: I. equilibrium with market trading
in both states; II. equilibrium with market trading in normal state s = 1 and no
trade in a crisis state s = 2; III. equilibrium with no trade in both states. Further-
more, the presence of adverse selection leads to a lower level of investments x, and
lower welfare relative to an equilibrium without adverse selection.
The presence of adverse selection leads to the lower price level and price volatil-
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ity across states. The market price in a crisis state is lower relative to the normal
state since the fraction of low quality assets is larger. As a result, assets o¤ered for
sale at t = 1 have lower expected return. Informed investors are beneting from
the private information at the expense of liquidity traders. Furthermore, adverse
selection leads to the loss in aggregate welfare since informed investors sell low
productive investments instead of liquidating them.
Properties of Equilibrium
Probability of a crisis state. The probability of a crisis state q reects the
investorsbeliefs about the likelihood of a crisis. In this section, I examine how
the equilibrium changes with respect to changes in q.
Corollary 1. If investors believe a crisis state is more likely to occur ( q is
larger) then (i) investment allocation is smaller; (ii) market prices are higher; (iii)
expected utility is lower. If the economy is in a type II equilibrium with market
trading in normal state and no trade in a crisis state then increase in q may lead
to shift a type I equilibrium with market trading in both states.
The higher probability of a crisis state q implies a higher probability of the
asset becoming a lemon, which makes asset ex-ante less less protable. Therefore,
the increase in probability of a crisis state q leads to a lower level of investment
allocation and lower expected utility. The smaller investment at t = 0 implies the
smaller supply and larger demand for risky assets at t = 1. This leads to higher
market prices (in both type I and II equilibria).
The fact that the market price is increasing in the probability of a crisis state q
makes it is possibility to move from one type of equilibrium to another. Suppose an
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economy is in type II equilibrium where there is no trade in a crisis state. Suppose
the probability of a crisis state q increased, i.e., investors believe a crisis is now
more likely to occur. Then it is possible that the price in a crisis state will increase
su¢ ciently to switch to type I equilibrium with market trading in both states.
(If an economy is initially in type I equilibrium then the type of the equilibrium
will not change if q is increased. If an economy is in type II equilibrium and the
probability q is decreased then the equilibrium type will not change either.)
Consider the following numerical example. The asset return parameters are
given RL = 0; RH = 1:3; r = 0:65, the fraction of low quality investments in
a normal state: 1 = 0:05 and in a crisis state 2 = 0:25; and probability of a
liquidity shock  = 0:3. In this example, 5% of assets become lemons (with zero
payo¤) in a normal state, and in a crisis state, the quarter of all assets are lemons.
Figure 2.1 depicts the equilibrium values of investment, prices and expected utility
as a function of probability of a crisis state q: At q = 0:25, there is a switch from
an equilibrium with no trade in a crisis state to an equilibrium with trading in
both state.
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Figure 2.1: Changes in equilibrium values of investment, prices and expected utility
as a function of probability of the crisis.
Therefore, the initial expectation can a¤ect the type of equilibrium. The un-
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derestimating the likelihood of a crisis may result in the no-trade outcome if a
crisis state is realized.
Suppose a probability of a crisis q depends on the previously realized state.
So that conditional probability of transition from a normal state to a crises state
is smaller than the conditional probability of remaining in a crisis state. The
transition matrix is given by
264 1  q12 q12
1  q22 q22
375 where q22 > q12 and qjk = Pr(s =
skjs = sj). Then we can compare equilibria sequentially.
Lets look again at the numerical example considered before. Suppose q11 = 0:1
and q22 = 0:5. If an economy is in a normal state then it is in type II equilibrium:
if the crisis is realized, there is no trading. Once economy is in a crisis state, the
beliefs are revised and investment allocation are adjusted, and an economy moves
to the type I equilibrium. So, the market trading is resumed next period even if
the crisis state persists.
Liquidity preference. Now consider the situation when a crises is accompanied
by an exogenous increase in liquidity preference  in addition to a larger fraction
of low quality assets.
Corollary 2. Suppose the economy is type I equilibrium with market trading
in both states. The increase in liquidity preference  in a crisis state may lead to
shift a type II equilibrium with market trading in normal state and no trade in a
crisis state.
The price is a decreasing function of preference for liquidity . Therefore, the
higher preference for liquidity  in a crisis state results in the further decrease of
the market price relative to a normal state. Hence, the lack of liquidity during the
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Figure 2.2: Changes in equilibrium values of investment and prices as a function
of probability of the liquidity shock.
crisis may amplify the adverse selection problem pushing the asset prices further
down and possibly leading to a complete breakdown of trade. This reects the
re-sale phenomenon when depressed prices reect the di¢ culty of nding buyers
during the crisis.
Again consider the numerical example: RL = 0; RH = 1:3; r = 0:65, the
fraction of low quality investments in a normal state: 1 = 0:05 and in a crisis
state 2 = 0:25; and probability of a liquidity shock  = 0:3. Figure 2.2 illustrates
the e¤ect of an increase in the liquidity preference in a crisis state 2 from 0:3 to
0:35 on the equilibrium investment and prices. When preference for liquidity is
the same in both states 1 = 2 = 0:3, there is trading in both states. However, if
2 > 0:325 then there is no trade in a crisis state.
The next gure 2.3 depicts the equilibrium investment and prices as a function
of probability of a crisis state q when the preference for liquidity in a crisis state is
higher: 1 = 0:3 and 2 = 0:31. The threshold value of a crisis likelihood (where
economy switches from type II to type I equilibrium) is larger relative to the case
when the liquidity preference in both states are the same 1 = 2 = 0:3. If a
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Figure 2.3: Changes in equilibrium values of investment and prices as a function
of probability of the crisis.
crisis is accompanied by ight to liquidity, the adverse selection e¤ect is magnied
exacerbating the asset price volatility.
2.3.3 Central Planner Allocation
In this section, I analyze the equilibrium from the central planner prospective.
First, consider the case when it is public information which investor has received
a liquidity shock. Then the central planner solve the following maximization prob-
lem:
max
x
f log c1 + (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs (s log c2L (s) + (1  s) log c2H (s))g
s:t: (i) c1 =
1 x

(ii) c2L (s) = x
 
r +Rs

1 

(iii) c2H (s) = x
 
RH +Rs

1 

The optimal investment allocation is xo = (1  ) and the consumption allo-
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cations are given by
co1 = 1
co2L (s) = (1  ) r + Rs
co2H (s) = (1  )RH + Rs
Next, suppose that the identity of investors hit by a liquidity shock is private
information. This adds incentive compatibility constraints to the maximization
problem: the period one consumption c1 has to be less than any of the consump-
tions in period two. The smallest period two consumption is attained in state 2
with low productive investment: c2L (s2). Therefore,
(iv) c1  c2L (s2)
If an equilibrium (co1; c
o
2j (s) : j = L;H) satises the incentive compatibility
constraint (iv) then it remains an equilibrium.
If not, then the equilibrium investment allocation xoo is given by
xoo =
1  
(1  ) +   (1  ) r + R2
The consumption allocations are given by
coo1 = c
oo
2L (s) =
(1  ) r + R2
(1  ) +   (1  ) r + R2
coo2H (s) =
(1  )RH + R2
(1  ) +   (1  ) r + R2
Note, that the investment allocation in the new incentive compatible equilib-
rium is larger than in the previous one: xoo > xo. This benets late consumers with
high productive investments at the expense of early consumers and late consumers
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with low productive investments. Furthermore, the second period consumption
depends on which state is realized, however, it does not depend on the probability
of a crisis.
Now we can compare the market vs the central planner equilibrium. First, lets
look at the equilibrium without adverse selection. The investment allocation in a
market equilibrium is larger than in the central planner solution. The expected
consumption of late consumers is larger, and the expected consumption of early
consumers is smaller than the corresponding central planner consumption alloca-
tion. (See gure 2.4 for an example.) The market equilibrium is optimal when
p = 1.9
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Figure 2.4: Consumption allocation in equilibrium without adverse selection as a
function of probability of the crisis.
The adverse selection results in a lower consumption for both early and late
consumers in each state. However, the late consumers with low productive invest-
ment benet from adverse selection and get a higher level of consumption in a
normal state relative to the central planner allocation. The rest of the investors
consume less. The market equilibrium with adverse selection is not optimal. (See
gure 2.5 for an example.) The central planner can improve upon the market
equilibrium by preventing the adverse selection.
9See section A.3 of the Appendix for the proof.
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Figure 2.5: Consumption allocation in equilibrium with adverse selection as a
function of probability of the crisis.
2.4 Conclusion
I analyze the e¤ect of adverse selection in the asset market. The asymmetric
information about asset returns generates the lemons problem when buyers do not
know whether the asset is sold because of its low quality or because the sellers
sudden need for liquidity. This adverse selection can lead to the market illiquidity
reecting the buyersbelief that most assets that are o¤ered for sale are of low
quality. The lack of market liquidity and underestimating the likelihood of a crisis
can amplify the e¤ect of adverse selection leading to the increased asset price
volatility and possibly to a breakdown of trade during the crisis.
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CHAPTER 3
EQUITY HOME BIAS UNDER AMBIGUITY AVERSION
3.1 Introduction
Equity home bias is a well known puzzle in international nance, referring to a wide
disparity between the actual portfolio weights and the weights recommended by
the international equity portfolio theory. Under ideal conditions, the international
capital asset market model predicts that investors should hold equities from around
the world in proportion to their market capitalization. However, according to
the empirical ndings of French and Poterba [36] and Tesar and Werner [74],
investors hold a substantially larger proportion of their wealth in domestic assets:
US investors hold 92.2% of their equity portfolio in domestic stocks; Japanese
investors - 95.7%; UK investors - 92%; German investors - 79%; French investors
- 89.4%, and Canadian investors - 93.4%. This observed high concentration in
domestic equity has become known as "equity home bias".
There have been various attempts to explain this puzzle. The rst approach
is based on information asymmetries1, hedging possibilities against domestic risk2,
and barriers to international investment such as restrictions on international cap-
ital ows3, withholding taxes, and transactions costs4. Another approach focuses
on investors behavioral biases, e.g., optimism about their domestic markets5 and
preference for the familiar6. Lewis [62] and Strong and Xin [72] provide an ex-
1Gehrig (1993) [37], Kang and Stulz (1997) [50],Ahearne, Griever, Warnock (2004)[5],Jeske
(2001) [48]
2Baxter and Jermann(1995) [11], Cooper and Kaplanis(1994) [24], Uppal (1992) [76]
3Black (1974) [13], Stulz (1981) [73]
4Tesar and Werner (1995) [74], Warnock (2002) [79], Obstfeld (2000) [69]
5French and Poterba (1991) [36]
6Huberman (2001) [47], Coval and Moskowitz (1999) [26]
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tensive review of proposed explanations. Empirical studies7 nd that home bias is
caused by both institutional and behavioral factors.
A more recent research direction explains home bias by means of ambiguity
aversion. According to the standard expected utility theory, agents are assumed
to make decisions under uncertainty as if they have a prior belief about probabil-
ity distribution over the set of possible states of the world and then maximize the
expected utility according to this distribution. However, individuals often fail to
accurately assess such probabilities. Knight [58] suggests that there is an important
di¤erence between events with objectively (or subjectively) known probabilities,
and events where probabilities are unknown. Uncertainty of the rst kind is called
risk, and uncertainty of the second kind is called ambiguity or Knightian uncer-
tainty. Ellsberg [32] demonstrates the signicance of this distinction by showing
that individuals may prefer gambles with specied probabilities over gambles with
unknown odds. In the experiment, two urns are given: one contains 50 red balls
and 50 black balls, and the other contains 100 red and black balls in unknown
proportion. One ball is drawn at random from each urn. In gamble A, the payo¤
is $100 if a red ball is drawn and $0 if a black ball is drawn. In gamble B, the
payo¤ is $100 if a black ball is drawn and $0 if a red ball is drawn. When surveyed,
many people choose to draw from rst urn in both gambles. Such behavior con-
tradicts the standard expected utility paradigm according to which participants
form subjective beliefs in the form of a single probability distribution over the
composition of balls in the second urn. This experiment has motivated various
generalizations of subjective expected utility theory that incorporate ambiguity.
One of the most popular approaches is the maxmin multiple prior model of Gilboa
and Schmeidler where agents make decisions based on the worst among the many
7Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2005) [10], Karlsson and Norden (2004) [51], Kyrychenko, Shum
(2006) [61].
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possible probability distributions for any given choice.
This paper develops a two-country model that illustrates how ambiguity about
asset payo¤s a¤ects asset prices and portfolio holdings. Agents live in a Lucas
pure-exchange economy with a safe asset and two country-specic risky assets.
There is ambiguity about assetspayo¤s, i.e., the agents are uncertain about the
exact probability distribution. Similarly to the model developed by Easley and
OHara [31], ambiguity averse investors act as if they have a set of distributions on
payo¤s, and select a portfolio in order to maximize their utility over this set of dis-
tributions. Agents preferences are characterized by the smooth model of decision
making under ambiguity that has been axiomatized by Klibano¤, Marinacci, and
Mukerji [57]. The advantage of using the smooth model is that it allows for inter-
mediate values of ambiguity aversion coe¢ cients rather than the extreme cases of
minimal expected utility and standard expected utility maximizing agents. More-
over, it also simplies the analysis due to the smoothness conditions, which makes
the model analytically tractable.
All investors possess the same information about the set of possible states and
the corresponding returns distribution in each state, but have di¤erent beliefs about
the likelihood of these states. Optimism and overcondence refer to the distorted
beliefs about expected mean and dispersion of the asset returns distributions, re-
spectively. I show that the di¤erence in beliefs about perceived uncertainty leads to
the bias in portfolio holdings. The equilibrium portfolio allocation depends on the
degree of ambiguity aversion as well as parameters that characterize uncertainty.
To see whether the equity home bias observed in data can be explained by a
less extreme degree of ambiguity aversion, I analyze a numerical example using
stylized facts about asset returns. I nd that when investors are ambiguity averse
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then it is possible that even small di¤erence in beliefs about perceived uncertainty
may generate a home bias in portfolio holdings that is close to the data.
The two most closely related papers are Epstein and Miao [33] and Uppal and
Wang [77]. Epstein and Miao use a recursive multiple-prior model, a multi-period
extension of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) maxmin model. They consider agents
(countries) who are equally ambiguity averse but have di¤erent sets of multiple
priors, and hence do not agree on which states are ambiguous. Uppal and Wang
[77] study the portfolio choice when an investor accounts for model misspecica-
tion. They follow the robust control approach introduced by Hansen, Sargent and
Tallarini [42] and Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent [9] where agents use a reference
model to di¤erentiate among the priors and maximize the minimum expected util-
ity (minimize the worst case loss) over the set of possible models. Hansen, Sargent,
Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2006) established that the model set of robust
control can be viewed of as a particular specication of Gilboa and Schmeidlers
set of priors. In their paper, Uppal and Wang show that if the condence about
joint stock distribution is low then small di¤erences in the degree of condence
for the marginal payo¤ distribution will result in a signicant underdiversication
relative to the standard mean-variance portfolio.
However, the notion of maxmin ambiguity aversion can be viewed as overly
pessimistic and may not accurately reect actual beliefs and preferences. In par-
ticular, Bossaerts, Guarnaschelli, Ghirardato and Zame [15] have shown that the
attitude toward ambiguity varies across individuals. This suggests that modeling
investorsdecisions by the maxmin rule may signicantly overestimate the e¤ects
of ambiguity on asset holding and asset prices. Moreover, Condie [23] shows that
in an economy where some agents are ambiguity averse (in the maxmin sense),
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and some are standard expected utility maximizers (in the Bayesian sense), the
former are unlikely to survive if there is an aggregate risk. This suggests that
agents who exhibit extreme ambiguity aversion may decide not to participate in
the market, i.e. not to hold any foreign asset at all. Easley and OHara [31] study
the non-participation of ambiguity averse individuals and examine its implications
for the regulation of nancial markets.
In contrast to the robust control approach, the preference representation by
Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji has an axiomatic foundation and stays within
the state-independent utility framework. Their model allows to smoothly aggregate
the decision makers information about the subjective relevance of each possible
probability measure as the true probability measure. This makes it similar to
the Bayesian approach. Unlike in Uppal and Wang, in my model the degree of
ambiguity aversion is the same for all assets, but investors perceive uncertainty
di¤erently for home and foreign assets. Also, my model examines the e¤ect of
the ambiguity on the asset prices and derives the upper bound on the degree of
ambiguity aversion for participation in nancial markets.
The idea that investors have di¤erent beliefs about uncertainty is supported
by surveys and empirical studies. Several papers in the home bias literature have
identied a systematic bias in investorspayo¤ expectations. French and Poterba
(1991) show that observed portfolio holdings could be explained by domestic in-
vestors having more optimistic expectations about domestic stocks than about
foreign stocks. This has been conrmed by empirical studies for Japan ( Shiller,
Kon-Ya, and Tsutsui [71] and China (Chen, Kim, Nofsinger, Rui [19]), experimen-
tal studies for Germany (Kilka and Weber [54]), and surveys of fund-managers
(Strong, Xin [72]). Graham, Harvey and Huang [41] also study the link between
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competence and investor behavior where investor competence is measured through
survey responses. They argue that the competence e¤ect contributes to home
bias. Tourani-Rad and Kirkby [75] investigate investor overcondence, socializa-
tion and the familiarity e¤ect, using a sample of New Zealand investors. They
nd support for the investor overcondence theory, using characteristics such as
past success, optimism, condence in ones abilities, investment experience and
investment-related knowledge. Lutje and Menkho¤ [64] nd that belief in an in-
formational advantage and relative payo¤ optimism towards home assets are the
driving forces of home bias. They argue that informational advantage often ap-
pears to be a perceived advantage, as fund managers with a home preference do
not forecast stock indices better than others, and they rely less on fundamental
analysis. Christo¤ersen and Sarkissian [21] relate geographic location and investor
behavior by comparing the performance of U.S. equity mutual funds located in and
outside of nancial centers. They argue that fund managers in nancial centers
tend to be more overcondent because of their proximity to private information.
Furthermore, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [78] argue that even when home
investors can learn what foreigners know, they choose not to. They show that
learning amplies information asymmetry since investors prot more from know-
ing information others do not know.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the model environment is
described next in section 2. In section 3, I consider three cases of distorted beliefs:
in case 1, there is no uncertainty about the home asset, in case 2, investors are
overcondent about the home asset, and in case 3, investors are more optimistic
about the home asset. Section 4 provides the equilibrium characterization. Section
5 describes the equilibrium properties. Section 6 presents the numerical results,
and section 7 concludes. All proofs are delegated to the Appendix.
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3.2 Model
I consider a model with two countries: A and B. One can think about country
A as one particular country and about country B as the rest of the world. The
total number of agents in both countries is I; I living in country A and (1  )I
living in country B, where  is between zero and one. Agents live in a Lucas
pure-exchange economy. There are three assets in the economy: one safe asset
m (bond) and two risky assets which are country-specic. The safe asset is the
same in both countries and its price and payo¤ are normalized to one. In addition,
each country has a risky asset, which yields a stochastic dividend in every period.
The holdings of risky asset in country k 2 fa; bg8 by an investor i is denoted by
xki All agents are identical within the country they live in, and each agent from
country k is endowed with m units of money and xk holdings of the home asset.
Hence, the total endowment in the economy is (I m; I xa; (1  )I xb). All assets
are traded on the international market so investors from both country have access
to the market. The price of risky asset of country k is pk and the payo¤ is rk:
There are innitely many possible (hidden)9 states; in each state s; asset payo¤
rk is normally distributed with mean rk(s) and variance 2k(s). I assume that
there is uncertainty only about the mean rk(s) of assetpayo¤s, the asset payo¤
variance is the same in all states: k(s) = k. Furthermore, the payo¤s on both
assets are independent. Investors do not know which state will be realized, so they
form beliefs about a set of possible realizations of mean payo¤s for each asset. The
investorsbeliefs are modeled as second-order priors over the rst order probability
distributions of asset payo¤s. The set of priors represent the ambiguity about
asset payo¤s. This partition into rst and second order distributions captures the
8For typographical convience subscripts aand b refer to country A and B, respectively.
9Agents only observe the realization of assetsreturns, the realization of states is not observed.
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separation between (objective) information and (subjective) beliefs. See Figure 3.1
for illustration.
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Figure 3.1: Possible distributions of payo¤s and distribution of beliefs.
The wealth of each investor i from country k is equal to wi = (ra pa)xai+(rb 
pb)xbi +m + pixk. Investors choose their optimal portfolio (xai; xbi) to maximize
their utility function.
The utility function is adapted from the smooth model of decision making under
ambiguity by Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). The individual preferences
are represented by
U(w) = E  [(Es [u(w)jsn])] (3.1)
where u() is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, s is a known prob-
ability distribution in each state s, and  is subjective probability distribution
over the possible probabilities s. The subjective prior  weights the importance
of each distribution s reecting an investors beliefs about the likelihood of each
state. The increasing function  characterizes the attitudes towards ambiguity.
The degree of ambiguity aversion is dened as (y) =  00(y)=0(y). If function 
is concave then it characterizes ambiguity aversion, which is dened as an aversion
to mean preserving spreads in . If function  is linear then the reduction of com-
pound lotteries can be applied and it becomes equivalent to the standard subjective
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expected utility. The model of maxmin expected utility: U() = mins Es [u()])
may be seen as an extreme case of my model with innite degree of ambiguity
aversion.
The smooth model allows the separation between ambiguity (a decision makers
subjective beliefs ) and ambiguity attitude (a characteristic of the decision
makers preferences ). It smoothly aggregates the decision makers information
about likelihood of each possible probability distribution, consequently, the indif-
ference curves are smooth rather then kinked. Note that in maxmin models, the
decision maker only looks at the the worst value.
I assume u(w) =  e w is a CARA utility function where  is the degree
of risk aversion. If investors are ambiguity neutral then  is linear: (y) = y;
if investors are ambiguity averse then (y) =  e y where  is the degree of
ambiguity aversion. These assumptions on investors preferences together with the
normally distributed payo¤s allow to derive results for prices and asset holdings in
closed-form.
3.3 Overcondence and Optimism
Investors believe that possible mean payo¤s (ra(s); rb(s)) are jointly normally dis-
tributed with mean (ra; rb) and covariance matrix
264 2a ab
ab 
2
b
375, where 2k charac-
terizes the dispersion of possible distributions for each asset and ab characterizes
the correlation between states. This correlation reects the investorsbeliefs that
if more favorable state is realized for one country than it is more likely to be real-
ized for the other one as well. The correlation is based on investorsexpectations
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rather than fundamentals, allowing to capture a possible contagion e¤ect between
the two countries. The investors expectations (beliefs) are the driving force of
at least some episodes of nancial market contagion. If investors expect the asset
returns in di¤erent countries to be correlated then their investment decisions cre-
ate links between otherwise separate markets that may lead to nancial contagion.
(Goldstein and Pauzner [38] and Keister[53])
The beliefs about the dispersion of payo¤s distributions depend on whether the
asset is domestic or foreign. Investors believe that there is less uncertainty about
the home asset than about the foreign asset, and they are more optimistic about
the payo¤s on the home asset. These assumptions are supported by the ndings
of Kilka and Weber [54]. They conduct a cross-country study in Germany and the
U.S. to investigate whether peoples subjective probability distributions on aver-
age exhibit systematic di¤erences in location and in dispersion. Their results show
that people consider themselves to be on average more competent in forecasting
domestic stock prices than in forecasting foreign stocks prices. Subjective prob-
ability distributions of stock payo¤s are signicantly less dispersed for domestic
stocks (associated with high condence levels) than for foreign stocks (associated
with low condence levels). Furthermore, domestic stocks are judged signicantly
more optimistically than foreign stocks. These observed patterns are consistent
with biases in individual judgment documented by psychological research (Heath
and Tversky [44]).
In this paper, I refer to optimism as distorted beliefs about the expected mean
and overcondence as distorted beliefs about the variance of mean returns dis-
tribution. The optimistic investors believe the expected mean is larger than the
true value, in particular, beliefs about the home asset payo¤s rst order stochasti-
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cally dominates beliefs about the foreign asset payo¤s. The overcondent investors
overestimate the precision of probability distribution of asset returns, in particular,
beliefs about the home asset payo¤s second order stochastically dominates beliefs
about the foreign asset payo¤s.
First, I will consider the economy with an extreme version of overcondence in
which investors completely ignore uncertainty about the home asset, and conse-
quently they behave as standard expected utility maximizers with respect to home
asset. In the next case, investors believe there is less uncertainty about the home
asset, i.e. the dispersion of possible distributions is smaller for the home asset than
for the foreign asset. Third, I consider the model where investors face the same
uncertainty about home and foreign assets but they are more optimistic about
payo¤s on the home asset.
3.3.1 Case 1. No Uncertainty about Home Asset
First, consider the extreme case when investors completely ignore uncertainty
about the home asset but not about the foreign asset. Investors form a single
prior about payo¤s on the home asset, i.e., instead of considering all possible dis-
tributions they put a mass point weight on one average distribution with mean
rk and variance 2k . In this case investors can exhibit any degree of ambiguity
aversion  with respect to the home asset but it is irrelevant since their beliefs
about asset payo¤s consist of a single prior. Consequently, results are equivalent
to having a linear - function with respect to the asset payo¤s, and therefore, it
is equivalent to ambiguity neutrality with respect to that asset. For foreign asset,
investors take into consideration all possible distributions and, therefore, the de-
gree of ambiguity aversion  matters. E¤ectively, investors are ambiguity neutral
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with respect to domestic asset and ambiguity averse with respect to the foreign
asset. See Figure 3.2 for illustration. The asset payo¤s are normally distributed
with some mean rk(s) and variance 2k : rk  N(rk(s); 2k); k = a; b. Investors
believe that the possible mean payo¤s are equal to the average of mean payo¤s if
it is a home asset, or normally distributed with mean rk and variance 
2
k, if it is a
foreign asset,
rk(s)
8><>: = rk if k is home asset N(rk; 2k) if k is foreign asset : (3.2)
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Figure 3.2: Ambiguity about foreign asset.
In the competitive equilibrium, investors choose portfolio holdings to maximize
their expected utility, and prices are determined such that markets clear. Since
asset payo¤s are assumed to be distributed normally and investors have a CARA
utility function, maximization problem can be expressed in terms of mean and
variance.
An investor i from country k solve the following optimization problem:
max
xhi;xfi

(rh   ph)xhi + (rf   pf )xfi   1
2

 
2hx
2
hi + 
2
fx
2
fi + 
2
fx
2
fi

(3.3)
where h; f 2 fa; bg denote respectively the home country and the foreign coun-
try for investor i.
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From now on, denote investors from country B by j and investors from country
A by i. Then the optimal demands for the home and the foreign assets are given
by
country A investors i: xai =
ra pa
2a
; xbi =
rb pb
(2b+
2
b)
;
country B investors j: xaj =
ra pa
(2a+
2
a)
; xbj =
rb pb
2b
:
(3.4)
Note that the di¤erence in the demand functions for home and foreign assets
depends on 2k where  represents the ambiguity attitude and 
2
k - the di¤erence
in beliefs about uncertainty of asset payo¤s. If investors consider asset payo¤s to
be more uncertain then they demand less of that asset.
In equilibrium, the demand for optimal asset holdings should satisfy the market
clearing conditions: the aggregate demand for optimal asset holdings should be
equal to the total endowment,
xai + (1  )xaj = xa; (3.5)
xbi + (1  )xbj = (1  )xb:
For investor i from country A, the equilibrium portfolio holdings (xai; xbi) of
asset a and b are given by
xai = xa
2a + 
2
a
2a + 
2
a
; (3.6)
xbi = (1  )xb 
2
b
2b + (1  )2b
:
For investor j from country B, the equilibrium portfolio holdings (xaj; xbj) of
asset a and b are given by
xaj = xa
2a
2a + 
2
a
; (3.7)
xbj = (1  )xb 
2
b + 
2
b
2b + (1  )2b
:
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If there is no ambiguity then the holding of each countrys asset is the same
for investors from both countries, and should be equal to the per capita supply of
that asset, i.e., xki = xkj = kxk where a =  and b = 1  . However, if there
is a di¤erence in perceived uncertainty about the home and the foreign asset then
portfolio holdings are biased towards the home asset: the holdings of home asset
xh is larger than its market capitalization hxh and the holdings of foreign asset
xf is smaller than its market capitalization fxf where h; f 2 fa; bg.
Note it is not the ambiguity by itself that causes the bias in portfolio holdings
but the distortion in beliefs. If investors perceive both assets as equally ambiguous
then their asset holdings are proportional to the market capitalization. Moreover,
Gollier [40] identied the conditions when the increase in ambiguity aversion can
lead to the increase in demand for the ambiguous risky asset.
3.3.2 Case 2. Overcondence about Home Asset
In this section I relax the assumption that investors completely ignore uncertainty
about the home asset, i.e., they behave as if they know the true distribution.
Suppose investors are now e¤ectively ambiguity averse with respect to both assets,
home and foreign, but they believe there is less uncertainty about the home asset.
See Figure 3.3 for illustration. In their beliefs they put more weight on distributions
that are close to the mean distribution, i.e., the dispersion of possible distributions
is smaller for the home asset than for the foreign asset. The payo¤s of asset
from country k are normally distributed with some mean rk(s) and variance 2k :
rk  N(rk(s); 2k); k = a; b. Investors believe that possible mean payo¤s are
normally distributed with mean rk and perceived variance 
2
kh if k is a home asset
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and perceived variance 2kf if k is a home asset, where kh < kf .
10
rk(s) 
8><>: N(rk; 
2
kh) if k is a home asset
N(rk; 
2
kf ) if k is a foreign asset
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
1
2
3
payoffs
pd
f
Overconfidence about home asset
homeforeign
Figure 3.3: Overcondence about home asset.
If the interstate correlation between assets is zero (ab = 0)11, then the equilib-
rium prices are given by
pa = ra   xa
 
2a + 
2
ah
  
2a + 
2
af

2a + 
 
2af + (1  )2ah
 ; (3.8)
pb = rb   (1  )xb
 
2b + 
2
bh
  
2b + 
2
bf

2b + 
 
2bh + (1  )2bf
 :
For investor i from country A, the equilibrium portfolio holdings (xai; xbi) of
asset a and b are given by
xai = xa
2a + 
2
af
2a + 
 
2af + (1  )2ah
 ; (3.9)
xbi = (1  )xb b + 
2
bh
2b + 
 
2bh + (1  )2bf
 :
For investor j from country B, the equilibrium portfolio holdings (xaj; xbj) of
10That is, 2ah denotes the perceived variance of asset a by investors from country A and 
2
af
denotes the perceived variance of asset a by investors from country B. Similarly for the perceived
variance of the asset b.
11See section C.2 of the Appendix for the solution when ab 6= 0.
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asset a and b are given by
xaj = xa
2a + 
2
ah
2a + 
 
2af + (1  )2ah
 ; (3.10)
xbj = (1  )xb
2b + 
2
bf
2b + 
 
2bh + (1  )2bf
 :
As in the previous case, the portfolio holdings are biased towards the home
asset. For the home asset, equilibrium holdings are larger than the market capital-
ization: xai > xa and xbj > (1  )xb. For the foreign asset, equilibrium holdings
are smaller than the market capitalization: xbi < xb and xaj < (1  )xa. When
investors face uncertainty (ambiguity) about both, home and foreign, assets, their
portfolio holdings will be biased towards the home asset if they are overcondent
about the home asset relative to the foreign. The extent of the bias depends on
the di¤erence in perceived uncertainty about two assets: 2kf > 
2
kh.
3.3.3 Case 3. Optimism about Home Asset
Now suppose investors face the same uncertainty about the home and the foreign
asset but they are more optimistic about payo¤s on the home asset. Investors have
distorted beliefs about the second-order distributions over states, with respect to
the home asset they are optimistic about the realization of states with realization
of payo¤s mean above average, and with respect to the foreign asset, investors
think that the states with realization of payo¤s mean which is below average is
more likely. See Figure 3.3 for illustration.
The asset payo¤s are normally distributed with some mean rk(s) and vari-
ance 2k : rk  N(rk(s); 2k); k = a; b. Investors believe that possible mean
payo¤s are normally distributed with mean rk and variance 
2
k, i.e., rk(s) 
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8><>: N(rkh; 
2
k) if k is a home asset
N(rkf ; 
2
k) if k is a foreign asset
where rkh > rkf .
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Figure 3.4: Optimism about home asset.
In this case, the equilibrium prices are given by
pa = (rah + (1  )raf )  xa(2a + 2a)  (1  )xbab; (3.11)
pb = (rbf + (1  )rbh)  (1  )xb(b + b)  xaab:
For investor i from country A, the equilibrium portfolio holdings (xai; xbi) of
asset a and b are given by
xai = xa
 
1 +
(1  )(rah   raf )(2b + 2b) + (1  ) (rbh   rbf )ab

  
2a + 
2
a

(2b + 
2
b)  (ab)2
 ! ; (3.12)
xbi = (1  )xb
 
1  (1  ) (rbh   rbf )
 
2a + 
2
a

+ (1  )(rah   raf )ab

  
2a + 
2
a

(2b + 
2
b)  (ab)2
 ! :
For investor j from country B, the equilibrium portfolio holdings (xaj; xbj) of
asset a and b are given by
xaj = xa
 
1  (rah   raf )(
2
b + 
2
b)) +  (rbh   rbf )ab

  
2a + 
2
a

(2b + 
2
b)  (ab)2
 ! ; (3.13)
xbj = (1  )xb
 
1 +
 (rbh   rbf )
 
2a + 
2
a

+ (rah   raf )ab

  
2a + 
2
a

(2b + 
2
b)  (ab)2
 ! :
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As expected, there is a bias towards the home asset in portfolio holdings. The
holdings of home asset is larger than its market capitalization (xh > hxh) and the
holdings of foreign asset is smaller than its market capitalization (xf < fxf ).
3.4 Portfolio Holdings and Ambiguity
The Proposition below summarizes and generalizes results considered in the pre-
viously analyzed cases.
Proposition 5 If investors are ambiguity averse with respect to both assets and
they are overcondent about the home asset relative to the foreign asset: kh <
kf ; k = a; b, or they are optimistic about the home asset relative to the foreign
asset: rkh > rkf ; k = a; b then investors will choose their portfolio so that the
proportion of the home asset is larger than its market share and the proportion of
the foreign asset is smaller than its market share:
xai
xai + xbi
>
xa
xa + (1  )xb ;
xaj
xaj + xbj
<
xa
xa + (1  )xb .
In equilibrium, the price for the home asset is higher than the expected price for
the home asset, and the price for the foreign asset is lower than the expected price
for the foreign asset based on the investors perceived ambiguity.
For simplicity, consider again the case 1 when investors completely ignore the
uncertainty about the home asset. The investors from country A believe that the
price for their home asset should be pah = ra xa2a which is the equilibrium price
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when all investors ignore uncertainty about the asset.12 However, since foreign
investors view the asset a as ambiguous the equilibrium price is given by
pa = ra   xa2a
2a + 
2
a
2a + 
2
a
(3.14)
The equilibrium price is higher than the price expected by home investors. There-
fore, country A believe that asset a is overpriced, so they have incentive to hold
more of the home asset.
Similarly, country B investors believe that the price for asset a should be paf =
ra   xa(a + 2a), which is the equilibrium price when all investors view the
asset a as ambiguous. This expected price paf is lower than the equilibrium price
pa. Since country B investors believe that foreign asset is underpriced, they hold
less of it in their portfolio.
Therefore, investors believe that asset a is overpriced if it is home asset, and
underpriced if it is a foreign asset. The same conclusions hold for asset b due to the
symmetry. Hence, investors see the arbitrage opportunities and as a result hold
more of the home asset and less of the foreign asset relative to their respective
market capitalization weights. Therefore, the equity home bias arises as conse-
quences of investors di¤erence in beliefs about uncertainty of the asset returns.
The same conclusions apply for both asset in more general cases when investors
are optimistic and overcondent about the home asset relative the foreign asset.
Unlike in models with asymmetric information, in this framework prices are
not informative. If prices are informative than informational advantage should
eventually be arbitraged away through the active trading. In this model, the
di¤erence in actual vs expected asset price reect the investorsdi¤erence in beliefs.
12It is equivalent to the case where all investors behave as standard expected utility maximizers.
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When an investor thinks that others have wrong beliefs then he has no incentive to
adjust his portfolio allocation after observing prices di¤erent from what is expected.
3.5 Equilibrium Properties
3.5.1 Comparative Statics
Next proposition summarizes the e¤ects of change in the degree of ambiguity aver-
sion, di¤erence in the perceived mean returns and perceived dispersions of mean
asset returns, correlation of asset returns, and market capitalization.
Proposition 6 The equity home bias is larger if (i) market capitalization  is
smaller; (ii) degree of ambiguity aversion  is higher; (iii) di¤erence in the per-
ceived mean returns 4rk  rkh  rkf ; (iv) di¤erence in the perceived dispersions of
mean asset returns 4k  kf   kh are larger; and (v) correlation of asset returns
ab  abab is positive.
The rst result explains why countries with small market capitalization (like
Canada or Scandinavian countries) exhibit signicantly larger home bias relative
to their market capitalization share. If investors from one country dominate the
market then they have a large impact on equilibrium asset prices. So the devia-
tion between equilibrium prices and the expected prices is smaller, therefore, the
portfolio holdings are closer to the market capitalization weights. Similarly, if the
proportion of investors from one country is relatively small than their asset holding
will be strongly biased towards the home asset.
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Table 3.1: Comparative statics summary.
n  " 4a " 4ra " ab "  "
pa # " " # #
xah ? " " # #
xaf # # # " "
The next three results are intuitive: these parameters (;4k;4rk) directly
contribute to the di¤erence in perceived uncertainty about two assets. If any of
these parameters increase it will lead to the increase of the home bias. If the degree
of ambiguity aversion increases then the prices of both assets go down, the holding
of the home asset may increase or decrease and the foreign asset holding decreases.
Overall, the equity home bias becomes larger. If for a given asset the di¤erence
in the perceived dispersions increases then its equilibrium price goes down. The
holding of this asset decreases if it is a foreign asset, and increases if it is a home
asset. Therefore, the equity home bias becomes larger. If for a given asset the
di¤erence in the perceived mean returns increases then its equilibrium price goes
up. The holding of this asset decreases if it is a foreign asset, and increases if it is
a home asset. Therefore, the equity home bias becomes larger.
If investors believe that the state realization of asset return distributions are
correlated then they will have incentive to hedge. If the correlation is negative
then investors will diversify more due to hedging motives, hence, the equity home
bias is smaller. On the other hand, the positive correlation reduces benets from
the diversication and leads to the larger home bias.
Table 3.1 summarizes all e¤ects of possible changes in parameters of asset a on
the price and asset holdings.
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3.5.2 Non-participation
Another implication of my model is that there is an upper bound on the degree of
ambiguity aversion that comes from the requirement of the asset price to be non-
negative. Investors will choose to participate in the market only if they believe
that the price for the foreign asset is positive. This means that if investors have a
degree of ambiguity aversion  such that
  rf   fxf
2
f
fxf
2
kf
; (3.15)
they will choose not hold any of the foreign asset. If the degree of ambiguity
aversion is too large, investor may prefer to hold on to their endowment of home
asset, rather than bear ambiguity associated with the foreign asset. This upper
bound out the participation of agents with maxmin type of preferences if there are
no restrictions on the set of possible means for asset returns. The upper bound
on the degree of ambiguity aversion is inversely related to the perceived ambiguity
about the foreign asset characterized by 2kf . Therefore, reducing ambiguity about
the foreign asset will increase its portfolio share and, hence, decrease the home bias.
Easley and OHara [30] and [31] demonstrate the potential benets from reducing
ambiguity, and examine the implications of the presence of ambiguity averse traders
for market regulations such as deposit insurance and securities regulation.
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3.5.3 Equity Premium
Dene the equity premium as EP  E[rk]=p   1. If all investors are ambiguity
neutral (SEU ) then equity premium is
EPSEU =
rk
rk   kxk2k
  1: (3.16)
If all investors are ambiguity averse (AA) then equity premium becomes
EPAA =
rk
rk   kxk(2k + 2k)
  1: (3.17)
The equity premium is higher under ambiguity, and as degree of ambiguity aversion
or the dispersion of possible distribution increases, the premium becomes larger. In
the presence of ambiguity, risk sharing opportunities o¤ered by nancial markets
become less complete which could lead to a no-trade equilibrium (Mukurji and
Tallon [68]). The positive e¤ect of ambiguity on the equity premium has been
addressed as an application by several papers on decision theory under uncertainty
(Epstein and Wang [34], Chen and Epstein [20]).
3.6 Numerical Results
In this section I will investigate the quantitative joint e¤ect13 of optimism and
overcondence on asset holdings. The asset returns are normally distributed with
some mean rk(s) and variance 2k : rk  N(rk(s); 2k); k = a; b. Investors believe
that the possible mean returns are normally distributed with mean rk and variance
2k, i.e., rk(s) 
8><>: N(rkh; 
2
kh) if k is a home asset
N(rkf ; 
2
kf ) if k is a foreign asset
where kh < kf and rkh >
rkf .
13The theoretical results are presented in the proof of Proposition 1 (Section C.3 of the Ap-
pendix).
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Table 3.2: Holdings of home asset when market capitalization is 50%.
 = 0:5  = 1  = 2
4kn 4rk 0% 1% 2% 5% 0% 1% 2% 5%
0% 50 53:10 56:19 65:48 50 53:10 56:19 65:48
1% 51:30 54:39 57:47 66:45 52:05 55:14 58:20 67:31
2% 52:60 55:67 58:73 67:78 54:10 57:15 60:18 69:07
5% 56:45 59:45 62:41 71:03 60:06 62:96 65:79 73:91
10% 62:56 65:37 68:10 75:83 68:93 71:42 73:81 80:43
 = 0:5  = 5  = 10
4kn 4rk 0% 1% 2% 5% 0% 1% 2% 5%
0% 50 53:10 56:19 65:48 50 53:10 56:19 65:48
1% 53:24 56:31 59:35 68:34 54:58 57:62 64:84 69:48
2% 56:45 59:45 62:41 71:03 59:03 61:97 75:43 73:11
5% 65:41 68:09 70:68 77:93 70:77 73:15 75:43 81:70
10% 77:02 78:97 80:81 85:81 83:44 84:87 86:22 89:84
I assume the following stylized facts:14 expected asset return rmt is 9%, asset
standard deviation (rmt ) is 16%, coe¢ cient of risk aversion is equal to 2. According
to Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004), the US market capitalization is about
48.3% ( ' 0:5) and the estimated home asset holding is about 89.9%.
Table 3.2 presents the home asset holdings for several values of the di¤erence in
perceived mean returns 4rk and perceived dispersions 4k, for di¤erent degrees
of ambiguity aversion. The perceived mean returns for the home asset is rkh =
1:09+4rk=2; and for the foreign asset it is rkf = 1:09 4rk=2. The exact values
of dispersions are chosen to match the equity premium of 8%; these values are
presented in Table 3.3.
As the degree of ambiguity aversion increases, the bias toward the home asset
becomes larger for any given di¤erence in perceived mean returns 4rk and per-
ceived dispersions 4k: The di¤erence in mean returns 4rk contributes more to
the bias then the di¤erence in perceived dispersions 4k. The signicant portion
14Cochrane [22]
77
Table 3.3: Perceived dispersion of foreign asset when market capitalization is 50%.
 = 0:5  = 1  = 2
4kn 4rk 0% 1% 2% 5% 0% 1% 2% 5%
0% 23:48 23:48 23:48 23:48 16:6 16:6 16:6 16:6
1% 23:99 24:02 24:05 24:08 17:12 17:15 17:18 17:27
2% 24:52 24:58 24:64 24:70 17:66 17:72 17:78 17:96
5% 26:21 26:36 26:51 26:66 19:43 19:58 19:72 20:15
10% 29:38 29:67 29:96 30:24 22:84 23:12 23:39 24:17
 = 0:5  = 5  = 10
4kn 4rk 0% 1% 2% 5% 0% 1% 2% 5%
0% 10:5 10:5 10:5 10:5 7:43 7:43 7:43 7:43
1% 11:02 11:17 11:08 11:17 7:95 7:99 8:02 8:11
2% 11:58 11:88 11:70 11:88 8:54 8:60 8:66 8:83
5% 13:50 14:19 13:79 14:19 10:61 10:74 10:88 11:25
10% 17:32 18:49 17:82 18:49 14:77 14:99 15:20 15:77
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Figure 3.5: Portfolio holdings of home asset for  = 1; 5; 10 and  = 0:5.
of the bias can be explained with relatively a small degree of ambiguity aversion
and di¤erences in beliefs within 5%. It is possible to match exactly the US domes-
tic asset holding observed in data but it requires large (but still nite) degree of
ambiguity aversion or large di¤erences in beliefs. The dispersion levels required to
match the equity premium is smaller for a higher degree of ambiguity aversion.
Figure 3.5 presents the home asset holdings as a function of the di¤erence in
perceived mean returns 4rk and dispersion 4k when  = 1 (ambiguity neutral-
ity),  = 5 and  = 10 when  = 0:5. The di¤erence in perceived mean returns
4rk ranges from 0% to 5% and perceived dispersions 4k ranges from 0% to 10%.
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Table 3.4: Holdings of home asset when market capitalization is 10%.
 = 0:1  = 1  = 2
4kn 4rk 0% 1% 2% 5% 0% 1% 2% 5%
0% 10 15:81 21:56 38:52 10 15:81 21:56 38:52
1% 10:99 17:02 22:94 40:18 11:42 17:54 23:53 40:88
2% 12:05 18:29 24:38 41:86 12:99 19:39 25:61 43:26
5% 15:68 22:48 28:98 46:92 18:56 25:67 32:36 50:38
10% 23:12 30:52 37:36 55:14 30:34 37:84 44:60 61:44
 = 0:1  = 5  = 10
4kn 4rk 0% 1% 2% 5% 0% 1% 2% 5%
0% 10 15:81 21:56 38:52 10 15:81 21:56 38:52
1% 12:31 18:60 24:73 42:26 13:38 19:85 26:11 43:83
2% 14:99 21:70 28:14 46:04 17:49 24:49 31:13 49:14
5% 25:10 32:57 39:41 56:99 33:42 40:86 47:50 63:81
10% 45:77 52:46 58:28 72:00 61:55 66:54 70:80 80:64
As proportion  of country A investors decreases, the equity home bias be-
comes larger. The intuition is the following: if investors from one country dominate
the market then they have a large impact on equilibrium asset prices. So the de-
viation between equilibrium prices and the expected prices is smaller, hence, the
portfolio holdings are closer to the market capitalization weights. Similarly, if the
proportion of investors from one country is relatively small than their asset hold-
ings will be strongly biased towards the home asset. Table ?? presents the home
asset holdings when the market capitalization is 10%, the values of dispersions are
presented in Table 3.5
Figure 3.6 presents the home asset holdings as a function of the di¤erence in
perceived mean returns4rk and dispersion4k when  = 1 (ambiguity neutrality)
and  = 10 for  = 0:1. The di¤erence in perceived mean returns 4rk and
perceived dispersions 4k ranges from 0% to 5%.
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Table 3.5: Perceived dispersion of foreign asset when market capitalization is 10%.
 = 0:1  = 1  = 2
4kn 4rk 0% 1% 2% 5% 0% 1% 2% 5%
0% 22:67 22:77 22:85 23:09 16:03 16:10 16:16 16:33
1% 23:51 23:61 23:71 23:97 16:87 16:95 17:02 17:21
2% 24:35 24:46 24:57 24:86 17:71 17:80 17:88 18:10
5% 26:90 27:04 27:18 27:55 20:28 20:39 20:50 20:80
10% 31:20 31:39 31:57 32:07 24:61 24:77 24:92 25:35
 = 5  = 10
4kn 4rk 0% 1% 2% 5% 0% 1% 2% 5%
0% 10:14 10:18 10:22 10:32 7:17 7:20 7:23 7:30
1% 10:98 11:03 11:08 11:21 8:01 8:05 8:09 8:19
2% 11:83 11:89 11:95 12:11 8:86 8:91 8:96 9:09
5% 14:50 14:50 14:58 14:82 11:47 11:54 11:62 11:82
10% 18:92 18:92 19:05 19:41 15:89 16:01 16:12 16:45
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Figure 3.6: Portfolio holdings of home asset for  = 1; 5; 10 and  = 0:1
3.7 Conclusion
My paper provides a simple theoretical framework that illustrates how di¤erences
in investors beliefs can generate equity home bias. In my model, all investors
possess the same information about the set of possible states and the corresponding
returns distribution in each state but they have di¤erent beliefs about the likelihood
of these states. This heterogeneity of beliefs leads to the asymmetry of portfolio
choices. This asymmetry is fundamentally di¤erent from information asymmetry
in the sense that prices are not informative. The idea that investors have biased
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beliefs about uncertainty of asset returns is supported by several papers in the
literature on home bias.
I quantify the e¤ect of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude on the portfolio hold-
ings and asset prices using the stylized facts. I show that the di¤erence in perceived
uncertainty can signicantly contribute to the bias towards domestic assets. The
extent to which the observed bias can be explained by the di¤erences in beliefs
and ambiguity aversion depends on which parameter values one is willing to ac-
cept as reasonable. Even though ambiguity does contribute to the explanation of
equity home bias, it is unlikely that the observed lack of diversication is entirely
due to ambiguity aversion, which leaves room for other explanations based on
institutional factors and information asymmetries. This is consistent with empir-
ical ndings that equity home bias is caused by both institutional and behavioral
factors.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Assumptions
Assumption 1a.  
Rdk   1

= Nk
 
Rpk   1

(A.1)
If there is no liquidity shock, investors are indi¤erent between holding direct
or portfolio investment at t = 0.
Assumption 1b. For each country k 2 fA;Bg; dk should satisfy
dk + A (1  dk) > B (A.2)
For each country k the parameters of payo¤ distribution have to satisfy the
following assumptions:
Assumption 2a. At t = 0; the demand for risky asset in each country k is
non-negative, i.e., xik  0 and xidk  0 if
 
Rpk   1

2k=N
 (Rkh   1)
2k
(A.3)
Assumption 2b. At t = 0; the demand for risky asset in both countries is less
than or equal to one, i.e.,
X
k2fA;Bg
xik < 1
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 
Rpk   1
  A  Rpk   ppk
(1  A) 2k=Nk
+
(Rkh   1)  A (Rkh   pdk)
(1  A) 2k
< 1 (A.4)
Assumption 3. At t = 1, investors demand for risky asset in both countries is
less than his money holdings.
X
k2fA;Bg
max

Rkh   pdk
2k
;
Rpk   ppk
2k=Nk

< min
(
1  xipk
ppk
;
1  xidk
pdk
)
(A.5)
where
xipk =
 
Rpk   1
  A  Rpk   ppk
(1  A) 2k=Nk
(A.6)
xidk =
(Rkh   1)  A (Rkh   pdk)
(1  A) 2k
A.2 InvestorsDecision Problem
Decision problem at t=1
Without loss of generality, consider the decision problem of a portfolio investor
in period one. Due to the mean-variance utility and assumption 2, the demand
for risky asset in period one is independent from the demand in period t = 0, so
that direct and portfolio investors who have not received a liquidity shock have
the same demands for risky asset at t = 1.
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If at t = 1 a portfolio investor i chooses to buy a portfolio investment yipk given
his investment xipk = Nkx
i
k at date t = 0:
max
yk
X
k=a;b
0B@ 1  xipk   ppkypk +  xipk + yipkRpk
 1
2
 
xipk
2
2k=Nk   12
 
yipk
2
2k=Nk
1CA
s.t. yipk  1  xipk
ypk  0
(A.7)
The optimal demand ypk for portfolio investment by a portfolio investor i at
country k 2 fA;Bg in period t = 1 is given by
yipk =
Rpk   ppk
2k=Nk
(A.8)
By assumption 2 and Property 1, the demand yipk is interior and it does not
depend on the probability of receiving a liquidity shock, so superscript i can be
omitted.
Similarly, if at t = 1 portfolio investor i chooses to buy direct investment yidk
given his investment Nkxipk at date t = 0:
max
yk
X
k=a;b
0B@ 1  xipk   pdkydk + xipkRpk + yidk eRdk
 1
2
 
xipk
2
2k=Nk   12 (yidk )
2
2k
1CA
s.t. pdkydk  1  xipk
ydk  0
(A.9)
The optimal demand ydk for portfolio investment by a portfolio investor i at
country k 2 fA;Bg in period t = 1 is given by
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yidk =
eRdk   pdk
2k
(A.10)
Decision problem at t=0
The decision problem of a portfolio investor from country i 2 fA;Bg at t = 0
becomes
max
xik
X
k=a;b
8><>:
i (1 Nkxik + ppkNkxik)+
(1  i)

1 +Nkx
i
k
 
Rpk   1
  1
2
Nk (x
i
k)
2
2k +
1
2
(Rpk ppk)2
2k

9>=>;
s.t. 0  xik  1=Nk
(A.11)
The optimal demand for the investment at country k by an investor from
country i in period t = 0 is given by
xik =
 
Rpk   1
  i  Rpk   ppk
(1  i) 2k
(A.12)
Then the portfolio investment is xipk = Nkx
i
k.
The decision problem of a direct investor from country i 2 fA;Bg at t = 0
becomes
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max
xidk
X
k=a;b
8><>:
i (1  xidk + pdkxidk)+
(1  i)

1 + xidk (Rkh   1)  12 (xidk)
2
2kl +
1
2
(Rpk ppk)2
2k

9>=>;
s.t. 0  xidk  1
(A.13)
The optimal demand for the investment at country k by an investor from
country i in period t = 0 is given by
xidk =
(Rkh   1)  i (Rkh   pdk)
(1  i) 2k
(A.14)
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The optimal demand for the investment at country k = a; b in period
t = 0 is given by
xipk =
 
Rpk   1
  i  Rpk   ppk
(1  i) 2k=Nk
(A.15)
xidk =
(Rkh   1)  i (Rkh   pdk)
(1  i) 2k
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First, lets show that xidk  xipk for any i 2 [A; B]
xidk =
(Rkh   1)  i (Rkh   pdk)
(1  i) 2k
=
=
 
Rpk   1
  i  Rpk   pdk
(1  i) 2k=Nk
>
 
Rpk   1
  i  Rpk   ppk
(1  i) 2k=Nk
= xipk
The expected utilities from holding direct and portfolio investments in country
k are given by
EU
 
xAdk (i)

= 1 + 0:5 (1  i)x2dk (i) 2kl + 0:5y2k2k=Nk
EU
 
xAdk (i)

= 1 + 0:5 (1  i)x2pk (i) 2k=Nk + 0:5y2k2k=Nk
Suppose b > 0, this implies that EU
 
xAdk (B)
  EU (xpk (B)) ()
x2dk (B) 
2
kl  x2pk (B) 2k
To show that a = 1 we need EU (xdk (A))  EU (xpk (A)) ()
x2dk (A) 
2
kl  x2pk (A) 2k
Taking derivative of x2dk (i) 
2
kl and x
2
pk (i) 
2
k with respect to , we get
(1  pdk)
(1  i)2 2kl
>
(1  ppk)
(1  i)2 2k=Nk
The above inequality follows from
eRdk   pdk
2k
=
Rpk   ppk
2k=Nk
=) 1  pdk
2k
>
1  pdk
2k=Nk
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Therefore, for A < B such that x2dk (B) 
2
kl  x2pk (B) 2k, we have
x2dk (A) 
2
kl > x
2
pk (A) 
2
k. This implies that all investors from country a obtain
a higher utility by holding direct investment rather than portfolio, hence, Ak = 1.
Next, suppose Ak < 1, this this implies that EU (xdk (A)) =
EU (xpk (A))() x2dk (A) 2kl = x2pk (A) 2k
=) x2dk (B) 2kl < x2pk (B) 2k () EU (xdk (B)) < EU (xpk (B)) : Hence,
b = 0:
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Dene EU (xik) = EU (x
i
dk)  EU
 
xipk

such that
EU
 
xik

= x2dk (i) 
2
kl   x2pk (i) 2k=Nk
Then the prices ppk and pdk are determined by equations (7) and (8). From
Lemma 1 it follows that it follows that there are ve possible cases that can occur
in equilibrium:
Case 1. l = 0; h = 0 if EU
 
xAk

< 0
Case 2. l 2 [0; 1] ; h = 0 if EU
 
xAk

= 0
Case 3. l = 1; h = 0 if EU
 
xAk

> 0;EU
 
xBk

< 0
Case 4. l = 0; h 2 [0; 1] if EU
 
xBk

= 0
Case 5. l = 1; h = 1 if EU
 
xBk

> 0
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Part 1 (i) If EU (xak) <0 then by Lemma1 EU
 
xbk

< 0. Therefore, there
is no direct investment in the equilibrium, i.e., Ak = 0; Bk = 0. The condition
EU (xak) <0 implies that
 Ak
(1 Ak) + (1  )
AkBk
(1 Bk)
Ak+(1 Ak)
2
(1 Ak) + (1  )
Bk+(1 Bk)2
(1 Bk)
<

2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
 Nk
2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
  e2k
2k=Nk
:
The equilibrium prices are given by
ppk = Rpk  
0@  Ak(1 Ak) + (1  ) Bk(1 Bk)
Ak+(1 Ak)
2
(1 Ak) + (1  )
Bk+(1 Bk)2
(1 Bk)
1A Rpk   1 ;
pdk = Rdk   e2k
2k=Nk
0@  Ak(1 Ak) + (1  ) Bk(1 Bk)
Ak+(1 Ak)
2
(1 Ak) + (1  )
Bk+(1 Bk)2
(1 Bk)
1A Rpk   1 ;
and (xidk; x
i
pk; yk) are given by (17) and (10).
(ii) Next EU (xak) = 0 then together with Property 2., we can derive the
equilibrium prices:
ppk = Rpk   1
Ak
0B@

2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
 Nk
2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
  e2k
2k=Nk
1CA Rpk   1
pdk = Rdk   1
Ak
e2k
2k=Nk
0B@

2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
 Nk
2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
  e2k
2k=Nk
1CA Rpk   1
Then Ak is determined by market clearing condition:
Ak =
( (1  A) + (1  ) (1  A)) yk   Axpk (A) + (1  )Bxpk (B)
 (A + (1  A)k)xdk (A)  Axpk (A)
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If EU (xak)  0 then Ak  0. If EU (xak) = 0 and Ak  1 then by Lemma
1 EU
 
xbk

> 0 which implies that Bk = 0. Case 1 and 2 constitute type I
equilibrium. If type I equilibrium exist, it is unique.
Part 2. Next consider EU (xak) > 0 and Ak  1 then EU
 
xbk

can be less
then, equal to, or greater than zero.
(iii) Consider EU (xak) > 0; Ak  1 and EU
 
xbk

< 0. Then Bk = 0. This
is a Case 3: separating equilibrium with Ak = 1 and Bk = 0.
ppk =
Rpk  
 
Rp   1
0@  Ak(1 Ak)+k 2k2kl+(1 ) Bk(1 Bk)
(1 Ak)+Ak

Ak
(1 Ak)
+k
 e2
k
2
kl
+(1 )Bk+(1 Bk)
2
(1 Bk)
1A
pdk =
Rdk   e2k2k=Nk
 
Rp   1
0@  Ak(1 Ak)+k 2k2kl+(1 ) Bk(1 Bk)
(1 Ak)+Ak

Ak
(1 Ak)
+k
 e2
k
2
kl
+(1 )Bk+(1 Bk)
2
(1 Bk)
1A
such that
1
Ak

2kl
2
k
=Nk
0:5
 Nk
2
kl
2
k
=Nk
0:5
  e2k
2
k
=Nk
<
<


Ak
(1 Ak)
+k

2k
2
kl
+(1 ) Bk
(1 Bk)
(1 Ak)+Ak

Ak
(1 Ak)
+k
 e2
k
2
kl
+(1 )Bk+(1 Bk)
2
(1 Bk)
< 1
Bk

2kl
2
k
=Nk
0:5
 Nk
2
kl
2
k
=Nk
0:5
  e2k
2
k
=Nk
(iv) Consider EU (xak) > 0; Ak  1 and EU
 
xbk

= 0. Then prices are
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given by
ppk = Rpk   1
B

2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
 Nk
2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
  e2k
2k=Nk
 
Rpk   1

pdk = Rdk   e2k
2k=Nk
1
B

2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
 Nk
2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
  e2k
2k=Nk
 
Rpk   1

The equilibrium fraction of direct investors from country b is determined by
market clearing condition. Contrary to the Part 1, the market clearing condition is
no longer linear in Bk since market beliefs about the probability of direct investor
receiving a liquidity shock (d) depends on Bk

d =
AkA+(1 )BkB
Ak+(1 )Bk

, and
therefore, variance e2k also depends on Bk. The equilibrium Bk is determined by
the market clearing condition
 (A + (1  A)kk)xdk (A)+
+ (1  ) (B + (1  B)k) Bkxdk (B)
+ (1  )B (1  Bk)xpk (B)
= [ (1  A) + (1  ) (1  B)] y
We can write excess demand as a quadratic equation in Bk : ED = c1
2
Bk +
c2Bk + c3 where
C1 =   (1  )2 k (1  k) (
2
kh   2kl)
(1  k)2kl + k2kh
0B@ Bk

2k
Nk
2
kl
0:5
  1

+k (1  Bk)

2k
Nk
2
kl
0:5
1CA
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C2 =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@


Ak
(1 Ak) + k

Ak
Bk

2kl
Nk
2
k
0:5
  1

(1  ) (1 + (1  k)Bk)
 

Ak
(1 Ak) + k

2k
Nk
2
kl
0:5
  1

(1  ) (1 + (1  k)Bk)
+
( (1  Ak) + (1  ) (1  Bk)) 1Bk

2kl
Nk
2
k
0:5
  1

(1  ) (1 + (1  k)Bk)
+


Ak
(1 Ak) + k

k(1 k)(2kh 2kl)
(1 k)2kl+k2kh
(1  ) (1  Bk)
Ak
Bk

2kl
Nk
2
k
0:5
  1

+ 1

+(1  )

2k
Nk
2
kl
0:5
k
k(1 k)(2kh 2kl)
(1 k)2kl+k2kh
 (1  Ak)
+ (1  ) Bk
(1 Bk)

2k
Nk
2
kl
0:5
  1

k(1 k)(2kh 2kl)
(1 k)2kl+k2kh
 (1  Ak)
(1  ) Bk
(1 Bk)
k(1 k)(2kh 2kl)
(1 k)2kl+k2kh
[(1  ) (1  Bk)]
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
C3 =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
  (+ (1  k)Ak)

Ak
(1 Ak) + k

2k
Nk
2
kl
0:5
  1

  Ak
Bk

2kl
Nk
2
k
0:5
  1

+( (1  Ak) + (1  ) (1  Bk)) 1Bk
(+ (1  k)Ak)

2kl
Nk
2
k
0:5
  1

 

Ak
(1 Ak) + k

Ak
Bk

2kl
Nk
2
k
0:5
  1

k(1 k)(2kh 2kl)
(1 k)2kl+k2kh
 (1  Ak)h


Ak
(1 Ak) + k

+ (1  ) Bk
(1 Bk)
i
k(1 k)(2kh 2kl)
(1 k)2kl+k2kh
 (1  Ak)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
C1 < 0 and max
Bk
ED > 0 (follows from EU
 
xAk

> 0). If C2 > 0 and C3 < 0
then there are 2 interior Bk 2 (0; 1)
If there are two equilibria with Ak = 1; Bk 2 (0; 1] such that EU
 
xbk

= 0
and EU (xak) > 0 then at Bk = 0; ED < 0 which implies that
92
Case 3 (separating equilibrium) is also an equilibrium with Bk = 0; Ak = 1.
If C2 > 0 and C3 > 0 the the equilibrium is unique. The existence of the unique
root follows from ED  0 at Bk = 1:If C2 < 0 then C3 < 0 which implies the
unique solution.
(v) Next consider EU (xak) > 0; Ak  1 and EU
 
xbk

> 0. This is a case
5 equilibrium with Bk = 1; 

Ak = 1 and prices given by
 
Rp   p

=
 
Rp   1
 


Ak
(1 Ak) + k

+ (1  )

Bk
(1 Bk) + k

2k
2kl
=
=
0B@  (1  Ak) + (1  ) (1  Bk)
+

Ak

Ak
(1 Ak) + k

+ (1  )Bk

Bk
(1 Bk) + k
 e2k
2kl
1CA ;
such that0BBBB@
B



Ak
(1 Ak) + k

+ (1  )

Bk
(1 Bk) + k

2k
2kl
=
0B@  (1  Ak) + (1  ) (1  Bk)
+

Ak

Ak
(1 Ak) + k

+ (1  )Bk

Bk
(1 Bk) + k
 e2k
2kl
1CA
1CCCCA >
>

2kl
2
k
=Nk
0:5
 Nk
2
kl
2
k
=Nk
0:5
  e2k
2
k
=Nk
All three cases are captured by type II equilibria and can be summarized in
the following way: If EU (xak) > 0 and Ak  1 and
 at Bk = 0 : EU
 
xbk

< 0 then there is at least one equilibrium with
Bk = 0; Ak = 1:
 at Bk = 0 : EU
 
xbk

< 0 and at Bk = 1 : EU
 
xbk

> 0 then there is 2
equilibria
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 at Bk = 0 : EU
 
xbk

< 0 and at Bk = 1 : EU
 
xbk

< 0 and
max
Bk
fEU  xbkg > 0 then there is 3 equilibria
 at Bk = 0 : EU
 
xbk

< 0 and at Bk = 1 : EU
 
xbk

< 0 and
max
Bk
fEU  xbkg = 0 then there is 2 equilibria
 at Bk = 0 : EU
 
xbk

< 0 and at Bk = 1 : EU
 
xbk

> 0 then there is 2
equilibria
 at Bk = 0 : EU
 
xbk

< 0 and at Bk = 1 : EU
 
xbk

< 0 and
max
Bk
fEU  xbkg < 0 then there is 1 equilibrium
 at Bk = 0 : EU
 
xbk

> 0 and at Bk = 1 : EU
 
xbk

< 0 then there is 1
equilibrium
 at Bk = 0 : EU
 
xbk

> 0 and at Bk = 1 : EU
 
xbk

> 0 then there is no
equilibrium
A.5 Proof of Property 4
Proof. Consider xik = xdk (i)  xpk (i)
xik =
 
Rpk   1
  i e2k2k  Rpk   ppk2
(1  i) 2kl=Nk
 
  
Rpk   1
  i  Rpk   ppk2
2k=Nk
=
 
Rpk   1

(1  i) 2k=Nk

2k
2kl
  1

  i
(1  i)
 
Rpk   ppk

2k=Nk
 e2k
2kl
  1

=
0B@ (Rpk 1)(1 i)2k=Nkk

2kh
2kl
  1

  i
(1 i)
(Rpk ppk)
2k=Nk
k
k+dk(1 k)

2kh
2kl
  1

1CA
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xik is increasing function of
2kh 2kl
2k
for any of the two pooling type of the
equilibrium prices. It can be shown that EU (xak) is also increasing function in
2kh 2kl
2k
. Therefore, if 
2
kh 2kl
2k
increases than k also increases .
If
 
Rdk  Rpk

are larger and/or Nk are smaller then k is larger in the equi-
librium.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (1) consider A as a host country. The type II pooling equilibrium
should satisfy the following conditions:
ppk = Rpk   1
B

2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
 Nk
2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
  e2k
2k=Nk
 
Rpk   1

pdk = Rdk   e2k
2k=Nkk
1
B

2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
 Nk
2kl
2k=Nk
0:5
  e2k
2k=Nk
 
Rpk   1

And Bk is determined from
 (A + (1  A)kk)xdk (A)
+ (1  ) (B + (1  B)k) Bkxdk (B)
+ (1  )B (1  Bk)xpk (B)
= ( (1  A) + (1  ) (1  B)) yk
Dene excess demand by ED. We can write the market clearing condition
as a quadratic equation in Bk : ED = c1
2
Bk + c2Bk + c3 = 0 where c1 < 0.
There are 2 possibilities: either unique equilibrium or two equilibria. There are
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two equilibria if c3 < 0. If A increases to 
0
A then the max
Bk
ED increases and
argmax
Bk
ED decreases. Denote Bk and 

Bk the two solutions to ED = 0 such that
Bk<

Bk. So that 

Bk (A) < 

Bk (
0
A) and 

Bk (A) > 

Bk (
0
A). If there is a unique
equilibrium (c3 > 0) then only the solution 

Bk remains. Therefore, if equilibrium
is unique then the increase in A leads to a higher fraction of direct investors in
equilibrium. If there are multiple equilibria, then the e¤ect is ambiguous.
(2) consider B as a host country. If B increases to B then the max
Bk
ED
decreases and argmax
Bk
ED increases. In this case Ak (B) > 

Ak (
0
B) and
Ak (B) < 

Ak (B). If there is a unique equilibrium (c3 > 0) then only the so-
lution Bk remains. Therefore, if equilibrium is unique then the increase in B
leads to a higher fraction of direct investors in equilibrium. If there are multiple
equilibria, then the e¤ect is ambiguous depending on the equilibrium.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.1 Private Information Equilibrium
B.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The market clearing in state s is given by xps = (1  ) (1  x). There-
fore, p1 = p2 = p since x is decided at t = 0. Hence, an investors maximization
problem becomes
EUs (x; p) =  log (1  x+ px)+(1  )
X
s=1;2
qs
0B@ s log  xr + (1  x)Rs=p
+(1  s) log
 
xRH + (1  x)Rs=p

1CA
The equilibrium price and investment allocation (x; p) are determined by the fol-
lowing system of equations:
 p 1
x(p 1)+1 + (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs

s
r Rs=p
x(r Rs=p)+Rs=p + (1  1)
RH Rs=p
x(RH Rs=p)+Rs=p

= 0
xp  (1  ) (1  x) = 0
Therefore, the equilibrium price is given by
pa =
+
X
s=1;2
qs

s
Rs
r+Rs

(1 )
+ (1  s) RsRH+Rs (1 )

+
X
s=1;2
qs

s
r
r+Rs

(1 )
+ (1  s) RHRH+Rs (1 )

By assumption 3 and 4, the equilibrium price p satises the dynamic consistency
conditions. Assumption 3 rules out the situation that a risky asset dominates
the safe asset at t = 1. If the market price p  1, then no one will choose to
hold the safe asset at t = 0. Assumption 4 rules out the situation that the safe
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asset dominates a risky asset at t = 1. If the market price p < p (r) such that
EU(p (r) ; x (r)) = (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs log
 
Rs=p (r)

then the return on the risky asset
bought at t = 1 is higher that the return on investment made at t = 0, hence, no
one will choose to invest in risky projects at t = 0.
If the market price p  r then the equilibrium investment allocation x is given
by
xa = (1  )
 
+
X
s=1;2
qs
 
s
r 
r +Rs

1 
 + (1  s) RH 
RH +Rs

1 
!!
If the market price p < r then an investors maximization problem becomes
EUno trade (x) =
0BBBB@
 log (1  x+ rx)
+ (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs
0B@ s log (xr + (1  x))
+ (1  s) log (xRH + (1  x))
1CA
1CCCCA
Therefore, the equilibrium investment allocation x is given by
xa =
(+ (1  )) (r   1) + (1  ) (1  ) (RH   1)
(1  r) (RH   1)
In both cases, the corner solutions: x=0 and x=1 are dominated by the interior
solution. If all endowments is invested in risky assets: x = 1, then the consump-
tion at date 1 c1 = 0, which implies the utility equal to negative innity. If all
endowment is kept in the safe asset then the expected utility is zero while interior
solution yields the positive utility since Rs > 1.
If it exists, the market equilibrium always dominates the no trade equilibrium
since it provides a higher consumption in each state in both dates. Suppose not,
let xa be a solution to the investor maximization problem even if p  r: The
expected utility in the market equilibrium is larger than the EUmarket (xa ; p) >
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EUno trade (x

a ) since Rs=p > 1 and p  r;
EUmarket (x

a ; p)
=
 log (1  xa + pxa )
+ (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs
0B@ s log  xa p+ (1  xa )Rs=p
+(1  s) log
 
xa RH + (1  xa )Rs=p

1CA
>
 log (1  xa + rxa )
+ (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs
0B@ s log (xa r + (1  xa ))
+ (1  s) log (xa RH + (1  xa ))
1CA
= EUno trade (x

a )
and 8x : EUmarket (xa; p)  EUmarket (x; p). Contradiction. It is impossible to have
market equilibrium in one state and no trade equilibrium in another state Since
the market price is the same in both states.
Furthermore, the investment allocation is larger in the market equilibrium
relative to no trade equilibrium: xa > x

a
xa   xa =


(1  ) + 1
(RH 1)

+(1  )
X
s=1;2
qs
0BB@ s

r
(r+Rs 1 )
+ 1
(RH 1)

+(1  s)

RH
(RH+Rs 1 )
  1
(1 r)

1CCA
=


(1  ) + 1
(RH 1)

+(1  )
X
s=1;2
qs

s

RHr+Rs

1 
r+Rs

1 

+ (1  s)

RHr+Rs

1 
RH+Rs

1 

> 0
The market equilibrium consumption:
c1 =
(1  x)

c1 =
 
+ (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs

s
Rs
(1  ) r + Rs
+ (1  s) Rs
(1  )RH + Rs
!
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c2i (s) = x

Ri +Rs

1  

c2i (s) =
(1  )  Ri + 1 Rs 
+
X
s=1;2
qs

s
r
(r+Rs 1 )
+ (1  s) RH(RH+Rs 1 )
!
Note, c1  1 since
X
s=1;2
qs

s
(1 )(Rs r)
(1 )r+Rs + (1  s)
(1 )(Rs RH)
(1 )RH+Rs

 0 which is
implied by p  1.
The no trade equilibrium consumption:
c1 = 1  x+ rx
c1 = (+ (1  )) RH   r
RH   1
c2i (s) = xRi + (1  x)
c2H (s) = (1  ) (1  ) (RH   r)
(1  r)
c2L (s) = (+ (1  )) RH   r
RH   1
B.2 Equilibrium with Adverse Selection
B.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Similarly to equilibrium without adverse selection, if the market equilib-
rium exist in a state s then it will dominate an equilibrium with no trade. Consider
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type (1) equilibrium:
maxx  log (1  x+ psx) + (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs
0B@ s log

xps + (1  x) eRs=ps
+(1  s) log

xRH + (1  x) eRs=ps
1CA
s:t (i) 0  x  1
(ii) ps  r 8s
Therefore, the type 1 equilibrium investment allocation and market prices are
determined by the following equations:
X
s=1;2
qs
0B@  ps 11 x+psx+
+(1  )

 ps 
eRs=ps
xps+(1 x) eRs=ps + (1  ) RH  eRs=psxRH+(1 x) eRs=ps

1CA = 0
(+ (1  )s) psx = (1  ) (1  x)
Substituting prices ps, we can get
Fb (x) 
X
s=1;2
qs
0BBBBB@
 1
( 1(1 )+s)
+ (1  ) (1 x)
(1 x)+ eRs( (1 )+s)2x
+(1  ) (1  s) RHRH+ eR1( (1 )+s)
1CCCCCA  x = 0
This is a monotonically decreasing function of x. At x = 0, Fb is greater than 0
and at x = 1, F1 is less than zero. Therefore, by Intermediate Function Theorem,
there exist a unique x such that at F1 (x) = 0 The x can be derived as a root
to a cubic equation:a1x3 + a2x2 + a3x+ a4 = 0, where
a1 =  d1d2
a2 = d1d2d3   ((1  ) q11 + 1) d2   ((1  ) q22 + 1) d1
a3 = ((d1 + d2) d3   1) + ((1  ) q11 (d2   1) + (1  ) q22 (d1   1))
a4 = d3 + (1  ) q11 + (1  ) q22
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d1 =
 eR1 
(1  ) + 1
2
  1
!
d2 =
 eR2 
(1  ) + 2
2
  1
!
d3 = 
X
s=1;2
qs
1
1
(1 ) + s
 + (1  )X
s=1;2
qs
(1  s)RH
RH + eRs  (1 ) + s
Denote the solution as xb ; then the prices are given by
pb (s) =
(1  )
(+ (1  )s)
(1  xb)
xb
If pb (s2)  r then this is the equilibrium of type (1).
If pb (s2) < r and p

b (s1)  r then consider type (2) equilibrium:type (1)
equilibrium:
maxx
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
 (1  q) log (1  x+ psx)
+ (1  ) (1  q)
0B@ 1 log

xp+ (1  x) eR1=p1
+(1  s) log

xRH + (1  x) eR1=p1
1CA+
+q log (1  x+ rx)
+ (1  ) q
0B@ 2 log (xr + (1  x))
+ (1  2) log (xRH + (1  x))
1CA
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
s:t (i) 0  x  1
(ii) p1  r
Therefore, the type 1 equilibrium investment allocation and market prices are
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determined by the following equations:
(1  q)

 p1 1
1 x+p1x + (1  )

 p1 
eR1=p1
xp1+(1 x) eR1=p1 + (1  ) RH  eR1=p1xRH+(1 x) eR1=p1

+q2

(+ (1  )2) r 1xr+(1 x) + (1  2) RH 1xRH+(1 x)
 = 0
(+ (1  )1) p1x = (1  ) (1  x)
Substituting p1; we can get
Gb (x) 
0BBBBB@
q1
0BB@ 
1
( 1(1 )+1)
+ (1  ) (1 x)
(1 x)+ eR1( (1 )+s)2x
+(1  ) (1  1) RHRH+ eR1( (1 )+1)   x
1CCA
+q2

(+ (1  )2) r 1xr+(1 x) + (1  2) RH 1xRH+(1 x)

1CCCCCA = 0
Gb is also a decreasing function in x, and it is positive at x = 0 and negative
at x = 1. Therefore, the solution exists and it unique. Let xb denote the solution,
then the market price in state s1 is given by
pb (s1) =
(1  )
(+ (1  )1)
(1  xb )
xb
If pb (s1)  r then this is the equilibrium of type (2). Note, xb < xb since
F1 (x

b ) > F2 (x

b ) = 0 and F1 is decreasing in x.
If pb (s1) < r then the equilibrium is of type (3). The type (3) no trade
equilibrium is the same as no trade equilibrium considered in Proposition 1, and
the equilibrium investment allocation is given by
xa =
(+ (1  )) (r   1) + (1  ) (1  ) (RH   1)
(1  r) (RH   1)
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Furthermore, the investment allocation in the market equilibrium without
adverse selection is larger than the investment allocation when adverse selection is
present: xb < x

a.
Let (xa; p

a) be the equilibrium without adverse selection. Now consider
the solution to maximization problem in Proposition 1 but with prices pb (s) =
1
( (1 )+s)
1 x
x
instead of pa =
(1 )

(1 x)
x
. Denote the solution as (xoa; p
o
b (s))
xoa = 
1

(1 ) + 

+ 1
+ (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs
0B@ s rr+Rs( (1 )+s)
+ (1  s) RHRH+Rs( (1 )+s)
1CA
< xa
0 =
X
s=1;2
qs
0BBBB@

pob(s) 1
1 xoa+pob(s)xoa
+(1  )
0B@ s r Rs=pob(s)xoar+(1 xoa)Rs=pob(s)
+(1  s) RH Rs=p
o
b(s)
xoaRH+(1 xoa)Rs=pob(s)
1CA
1CCCCA <
<
0BBBB@

pob(s) 1
1 xoa+pob(s)xoa
+(1  )
X
s=1;2
qs
0B@ s pob(s)  eRs=pob(s)xoapob(s)+(1 xoa)R=pob(s)
+(1  s) RH  eRs=pob(s)xoaRH+(1 xoa)Rs=pob(s)
1CA
1CCCCA = F1 (xoa)
Therefore, xb < x
o
a such that F1 (x

b) = 0. Hence, x

b < x
o
a < x

a:
Also, adverse selection lead to a lower expected price: pa >
pb ((1  q) s1 + qs2)  (1  q)pb (s1) + qpb (s2)
pa > (1  q)pb (s1) + qpb (s2)
In the presence of adverse selection, the highest utility is attained when there
a market trading in equilibrium in both states. The equilibrium consumption of
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early and late consumers are given by
cb1 (s) = 1  xb + pb (s)xb
cb2H (s) = xbRH + (1  xb) eRs=pb (s)
cb2L (s) = xbpb + (1  xb) eRs=pb (s)
The expected consumption at both dates in the equilibrium with adverse
selection are lower than the expected consumption at both dates without adverse
selection. Therefore, expected utility is lower. In case of adverse selection the low
quality projects do not get liquidated by informed investors. This results in the
losses of total welfare.
B.2.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. First consider an equilibrium with trade in both states.
The equilibrium investment allocation is determined from the following equa-
tion: Fb (x) = 0 (Fb (x) is dened in the proof of Proposition 2, it is derived by
substituting market clearing conditions into the FOC condition.) Denote by Fb1 (s)
the following expression,
Fb1 (s; x) 
 1
( 1(1 )+s)
+ (1  )s (1 x)
(1 x)+ eRs( (1 )+s)2x
+(1  ) (1  s) RhRh+ eRs( (1 )+s)   x:
Fb1 (s) = 0 provides the solution for the problem with one state. Fb1 (s) is
decreasing in s:Therefore, Fb (x) is decreasing in q. Also, Fb (x) is decreasing in
x. Hence, x is decreasing in q. The prices are determined by ps =
(1 )
(+(1 )s)
(1 x)
x
.
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Therefore, ps are increasing in q.The one-state expected utility is decreasing in s.
Therefore, as q becomes larger the expected utility decreases.
Now consider an equilibrium with a no trade state 2.Denote by Gb2 (x) =
(+ (1  )2) r 1xr+(1 x) + (1  2) RH 1xRH+(1 x)

. If we compute x such that
Gb2 (x
) = 0 and x such that Fb1 (s = 1; x) = 0 then x > x. The equilibrium x
in a two-state problem is detemined by Gb (x) = (1 q)Fb1 (s = 1; x)+qGb2 (x) = 0.
Since Gb (x) is decreading in x then the optimal x is decreasing in q. Therefore, p1
are increasing in q since it negatively depends on x. The one-state expected utility
is lower in a no-trade state vs the one with trade. Therefore, as q becomes larger
the expected utility decreases. The no-trade outcome arises since the price in the
crisis state falls below liquidation value. The increase in q may increase the price
in the crisis state su¤cintly to restoe the trading.
Consider some q such that p2 = r   " with " > 0. Then there is no trading in
state 2.
Fb1 (s = 1; x) =
 1
( 1(1 )+1)
+ (1  )1 1
1+ eR1( (1 )+1)2(r ")=( (1 )+2)
+ (1  ) (1  1) RhRh+ eR1( (1 )+2)   1(1+( (1 )+2)(r+"))
Fb1 (s = 2; x) =
 1
( 1(1 )+2)
+ (1  )1 11+ eR2( (1 )+2)(r ")
+(1  ) (1  1) RhRh+ eR2( (1 )+2)   1(1+( (1 )+2)(r+"))
Therefore, Fb1 (s = 1; x) > Fb1 (s = 1; x). If q increases su¢ ciently so that x goes
down by more than
( (1 )+2)"
(1+( (1 )+2)(r+"))(1+(

(1 )+2)r)
then the trading in a crisis
state restores.
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B.2.3 Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. Suppose now the economy is parametrized by state 1: (1; 1) and state
2 : (2; 2) such that 1 < 2 and 1 < 2.
First consider an equilibrium with trade in both states. The equilibrium
investment allocation is determined from the following equation: Fb (x) = 0
Denote by Fb1 (s) the following expression,
Fb1 (s; x) 
 1
( 1(1 )+s)
+ (1  )s (1 x)
(1 x)+ eRs( (1 )+s)2x
+(1  ) (1  s) RhRh+ eRs( (1 )+s)   x
Fb1 (s) = 0 provides the solution for the problem with one state. Fb1 (s) is decreas-
ing in : Also, Fb (x) is decreasing in x. Hence, x is decreasing in .
The e¤ect of increase in 2 on the price in state 2 is determined by
@p2
@2
=  
1
(1 2)2
2
1 2 + 2
2 (1  x)x   1 2
1 2 + 2
 1
x2
@x
@2
Therefore, increase in 2 can lead to the decrease in p2, potencially resulting
in p2 < r:
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B.3 Central Planner Allocation
B.3.1 Liquidity Shock is Public Information
Proof.
EU (c1; c2) =  log c1 + (1  )
X
s
qs (s log (c2Ls) + (1  s) log (c2Hs))
s:t: : c1 =
1  x

: c2L = x

r +R

1  

: c2H = x

RH +R

1  

IC : xR

1    1  x
=) xo = (1  ). The incentive compatibility constraint is satised since
(1  ) (r + (1  )RH)+R > 1. Therefore, consumption allocations are given
by
c1 = 1
c2L (s) = (1  )

r +Rs

1  

c2H (s) = (1  )

RH +Rs

1  

B.3.2 Liquidity Shock is Private Information
Proof. additional constraint:
c2L2  c1
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(1  ) r + R  1
if (1  ) r+R  1 then no late consumer has incentive to pretend to be an early
one =) xo = (1  ) if (1  ) r + R < 1 then x is determined by c1 = c2L2;
hence,
1  x

= x

r +R

1  

xoo =
1   
(1  ) +   (1  ) r + R2 = x
xoo =
1   
1   1  (1  ) r + R2 > 1  
Note, xoo < xo
1 
1 + 
1 
 
(1  ) r + R2
 < (1  )
1 < (1  ) +   (1  ) r + R2
Therefore,
coo1 = c
oo
2L =

1 
 
(1  ) r + R2

1 + 
1 
 
(1  ) r + R2

B.3.3 Central Planner vs Market Allocations
Proof.
EU (xo) = (1  )
X
s
qs
0B@ s log  (1  )  r +Rs 1 
+(1  s) log
 
(1  )  RH +Rs 1 
1CA =
= (1  ) log (1  ) + (1  )
X
s
qs
0B@ s log  r +Rs 1 
+(1  s) log
 
RH +Rs

1 

1CA ;
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EU (xa) =  log
(1  x)

+ (1  )
X
s
qs
0B@ s log  x  Ri +Rs 1 
+(1  s) log
 
x
 
Ri +Rs

1 

1CA =
=
0BBBB@
 log (1 x)

+ (1  ) log x
(1 )
+(1  ) log (1  ) + (1  )
X
s
qs
0B@ s log  Ri +Rs 1 
+(1  s) log
 
Ri +Rs

1 

1CA
1CCCCA ;
therefore, EU (xa)  EU (xo) =  log (1 x) + (1  ) log x(1 )
Claim: xa  xo = 1  
xa =  (1  ) + (1  )
X
s=1;2
qs
0B@ s r(r+Rs 1 )
+ (1  s) RH(RH+Rs 1 )
1CA
 1  
+
X
s=1;2
qs
 
s
r 
r +Rs

1 
 + (1  s) RH 
RH +Rs

1 
!  1
since
X
s=1;2
qs
h 
r  Rl
  (1  ) (1  s) (RH RL)(RH r)(1 )RH+Rs i  0. Hence,
EU (xa)  EU (xo) =  log (1 x) + (1  ) log x(1 )  0 since xa  (1  ).
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
C.1 No Uncertainty about Asset Payo¤s
The investors decision problem if there is no uncertainty about distribution of
asset returns:
maxf(ra  pa )xa +(rb  pb )xb +e 

2
(a x
2
a +b x
2
b )g (C.1)
The optimal demand for risky assets k = a; b :
xk =
rk   pk
2k
(C.2)
The equilibrium prices resulting from market clearing conditions:
pok =rk  kxk 2k (C.3)
The equilibrium demand for risky asset is equal to its market share
xok = kxk (C.4)
C.2 Uncertainty about Asset Payo¤s
The distribution of asset k returns, there is uncertainty (ambiguity) about mean
returns
rk  N(rks; 2k) (C.5)
rks  N(rk; 2k)
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The investors decision problem in the presence of uncertainty about distribu-
tion of both asset returns
max E

E[wjs]  1
2
var[wjs]

 1
2
2 V ar

E[wjs]  1
2
var[wjs]

(C.6)
(i) Cov(ra; rb) = ab 6= 0
max
8><>: (ra   pa)xa + (rb   pb)xb + e 2
2
(2ax
2
a + 
2
bx
2
b)  
22
2
 
2ax
2
a + 
2
bx
2
b + 2abxaxb

9>=>; (C.7)
Optimal demand for risky assets:
xa =
(ra   pa) (2b + 2b)  (rb   pb)2ab


(2a
2
b + 
2
a
2
b + 
2
b
2
a
 (C.8)
xb =
(rb   pb)
 
2a + 
2
a
  (ra   pa)ab


(2a
2
b + 
2
a
2
b + 
2
b
2
a

Equilibrium prices:
epa = ra   xa  2a + 2a  (1  )xbab (C.9)
epb = rb   (1  )xb(2b + 2b)  xaab
(ii) returns distributions are independent across states than Cov(ra; rb) =
ab = 0
The optimal demand for assets:
xa =
(ra   pa) (2b + 2b)


(2a
2
b + 
2
a
2
b + 
2
b
2
a
 (C.10)
xb =
(rb   pb)
 
2a + 
2
a



(2a
2
b + 
2
a
2
b + 
2
b
2
a

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Equilibrium prices:
epa = ra   xa  2a + 2a (C.11)
epb = rb   (1  )xb(2b + 2b)
C.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Investors are optimistic (rah > raf ) and overcondent (ah < af ) about
the home asset relative to the foreign. Then the decision problem of investor i from
country A :
maxE

E[wjsn]  1
2
var[wjsn]

 1
2
2V ar

E[wjsn]  1
2
var[wjsn]

max
n
(rah   pa)xa + (rbf   pb)xb   
2
(ax
2
a + bx
2
b) 

2
 
ah
2x2a + bf
2x2b
o
rah   pa   axa   ahxa = 0
rbf pb bxb bfxb = 0
xai=
(rah   pa)
 (a + ah)
xbi=
(rbf   pb)
(b + bf )
xaj=
(raf   pa)
 (a + af )
xbj=
(rbh   pb)
(b + bh)
Market clearing conditions:
xai + (1  )xaj = xa
xbi + (1  )xbj = (1  )xb
Equilibrium asset prices:
pa =
rah(a+af)+(1 )raf (a+ah)
a+(af+(1 )ah)
 xa (a+ah)(a+af)a+(af+(1 )ah)
;
pb =
(1 )rbh(b+bf)+rbf (b+bh)
b+(bh+(1 )bf)
 (1  )xb (b+bh)(b+bf)b+(bh+(1 )bf)
:
113
Equilibrium portfolio holdings for investor i from country A :
xai =
xa
(a+af)
a+(af+(1 )ah)
+
(1 )(rah raf)
a+(af+(1 )ah)
> xa
xbi =
(1  )xb (b+bh)b+(bh+(1 )bf)
  (rbh rbf)
b+(bh+(1 )bf)
< (1  )xb
Asset Prices
expected price by home investors :
epah = rah   xa (a + ah)
expected price by foreign investors :
epaf = raf   xa (a + af )
equilibrium price :
pa =
0B@ rah(a+af)+raf (1 )(a+ah)[a+(af+(1 )ah)]
 xa (a+ah)(a+af)[a+(af+(1 )ah)]
1CA
epah> pa>epaf
C.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Equilibrium portfolio holdings for investor i from country A :
xai = xa
a +  (4a + ah)
a +  (4a + ah) +
(1  )4ra
 [a +  (4a + ah)]
xbi = (1  )xb
(b + (4b + bh)
[b +  (4b + bh)]  
4rb
 [b +  (4b + bh)]
degree of ambiguity aversion  : If the degree of ambiguity aversion increases then
the prices of both assets go down, the holding of the home asset increases and the
114
foreign asset holding decreases. Hence, the equity home bias becomes larger
@xai
@
=
 xa2(1  )4a + 4a + ah
2(a +  (4a + ah))2
@xbi
@
=
 (1  )xb24b   4b   bh
2 [b +  (4b + bh)]2
< 0
If the degree of ambiguity aversion increases then the home asset holdings may
increase or decrease and the foreign asset holding decreases. Overall, the equity
home bias becomes larger.
 di¤erence in perceived dispersion of mean asset returns 4k = kf   kh:
@xai
@4a =
(1  )4ra
2 [a +  (4a + ah)]2
> 0
@xbi
@4b =
 (1  )4rb
2([b +  (bh + (1  )bf )]2
< 0
If for a given asset di¤erence in perceived dispersion of mean asset returns
4k increases then the holding of this asset decreases if it is a foreign asset,
and increases if it is a home asset. Therefore, the equity home bias becomes
larger.
 di¤erence in perceived mean returns of mean asset returns 4rk = rkh   rkf
:
@xai
@4ra =
(1  )
 [a +  (4a + ah)] > 0
@xbi
@4rb =
 
([b +  (bh + (1  )bf )] < 0
If for a given asset di¤erence in perceived mean returns 4rk increases then
the holding of this asset decreases if it is a foreign asset, and increases if it
is a home asset. Therefore, the equity home bias becomes larger.
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 population fraction 
@xai
@
=
xa [a + af ] 4ra
 [a +  (4a + ah)] < 0
@xbi
@
=
 xb [b + bf ] 4rb
 [b +  (4b + bh)] < 0
If size of the population in country A decreases relative to country B then
the equilibrium price for asset a goes up and the equilibrium price for asset
b goes down. In country A, the home asset holdings increase and the foreign
asset holdings decrease; vice versa for country B. Therefore, the equity home
bias becomes larger.
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